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Arab Spring: 
Islamization of Democracy or 
Democratization of Islamism 
 
Salma Daabous 
 
Abstract 
Events that followed the Arab Spring have demonstrated a contentious and 
often irreconcilable relationship between the secular and Islamist’s conceptualizations 
of Arab democracy.  The type and form of the new regime have only infuriated new 
divisive politics pitting groups in an unwavering struggle, often reversing democratic 
prospects. This thesis compares and contrasts the different Islamists’ paths followed 
by Ennahda Movement in Tunisia and the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in Egypt 
in order to reveal aspects of contentions and reconciliations between democracy and 
Islamism.  Whether Post-Arab Spring states will witness the democratization of Islam 
or Islamization of democracy is what this thesis attempt to reveal. 
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1 Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 After the revolution against autocracy erupted in Tunis, during December 
2010, and witnessed the toppling-down of its president Zine-el-Abidine Bin Ali, the 
election to the new National Assembly brought to victory the Islamist “Ennahda 
Islamic party”. In a very similar scenario, the post revolution elections in Egypt 
resulted with striking victory of the Islamist, “Muslim Brotherhood” represented by 
the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), in both, the People’s assembly and the 
Presidency.  
Demands for democracy and liberty in autocratic Arab regimes, especially in Tunis, 
Egypt and Libya, inspired the “Arab Spring” movement. Optimism, however, began 
to fade away after waves of Islamist electoral victory in Arab spring states triggered 
doubt regarding the democratic path of these states. International disputes and power 
struggle stripped many of these revolutions from their original domestic reform 
intentions. Yet, the rise of Islamists throughout the region has constituted the single 
most daunting task facing these states’ transition toward democracy. The ambiguous 
relationship between Islamists and democratic rule is not promising, as historic 
experiences provided vivid evidences of Islamists capturing power to repress 
opposition and deny democratic process. The puzzling question that continues to 
demand explanation is how can Islamist be related to democracy and liberty and to 
what extent can they apply the norms that were demanded in the Arab Spring 
demonstrations?   
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1.1 Introduction to the Thesis  
While the previous revolutions of Tunis and Egypt received a support of all the 
parties and factions of their society, Syria’s revolution seemed to suffer a rift among 
its domestic sectarian groups. Thus, despite their full awareness of the brutal character 
of the regime, during the first years of the Syrian uprisings, Christians of Syria as well 
as its Alawites tended to support the regime against the protestors, afraid of being 
dominated by the Sunni majority rule. The question of sectarian minorities and fear of 
Islamists’ tyrant majority is, thus, a major aspect that needs to be addressed in any 
transitional views. 
The controversy between the application of democracy and Islam was definitely 
analyzed by many political scientists. Many written documents, books, and papers 
have treated the issue of democracy’s impact on Islam, as well as the impact of Islam 
on democracy. They either explained the historical success of Islamic countries like 
Turkey and Indonesia in implementing democracy or analyzed the interpretation of 
Quran in favoring people’s representations, but none was able to speak broadly about 
the contents of the political programs of Islamist Parties, or the way they can promote 
themselves in countries thirsty for liberty.  
Therefore, the thesis presents in short, the reasons behind the success of Islamists, and 
the previously analyzed correlation between Islam itself and democracy in the 
application of al-Quran, and further addresses the ability of Islamist parties to cope 
with democracy and liberty as well as their ability to set an agenda that represents 
claimed Islamic values within a democratic rule. It examines democracy-promoting 
Islamist parties in the Arab world, the main two parties re-emerging after the Arab 
Spring in Tunis and Egypt.  This thesis focuses the analysis on the experience of two 
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Islamist parties in their rapprochement to democratic rules as case study: Ennahda in 
Tunis and Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt. Based on the cases examined and 
analyzed, it evaluates the extent to which Islamists can preserve the “Springish” 
outlook of the Arab Revolution. Ultimately, the aim is to reveal evidences that support 
or refute the propositions associating contemporary Islamists and democratization. 
1.2 Political Islam 
When we speak about Islamist parties, there is a certain must to go deep into 
the religious aspect of these political organizations and to the roots of their beginnings. 
The emergence of Islamic religion into politics dates back to the first four successors 
of Prophet Muhammad, the Rashidun Caliphs , followed by the great Islamic 
dynasties, Umayyad and Abbasid, until the rise of what Peter Mandaville calls, in his 
book Global Political Islam, the Muslim Political Society, including the Ulama, Sufis, 
Shariah, and the state (Mandeville, 2007).  
In order to highlight the meaning of Islamism, Daniel Pipes wrote a study in 1998 in 
which he distinguished Islam from Islamism (Pipes, 1998, June 30). Pipes explained 
that Islamism is the complete adherence required from a Muslim to the sacred law of 
Islam, offering ways to control the state and the society. In the pre-Islamic Arab 
society, an unorganized rule with no judicial system to set the basics of governance 
reigned. However, with the rise of Islam with Prophet Muhammad, a new trend of rule 
began to appear in line with laws set in the Qoran, with a command of a just arbitration. 
Yet, the application of this rule and the arbitrations through the Qoranic jurisdiction 
were still a subject of controversy among Islam, as well as observers who analyzed the 
applicability of the latter.  
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Islam goes beyond its religious and spiritual meanings. It is a “whole civilization”, as 
explained by Bernard Lewis in his article, Islam and Liberal Democracy (Bernard, 
1996). Islam emerged as the ideal and only law that regulates an Islamic society along 
with the emergence of Jurisprudence Science since the Umayyad period, in 661, 
through the literal words of God, as written in “Quran”, the “Sunna”, taking the life of 
Prophet Muhammad as the living model, the “Ijma” meaning consensus of the relied 
Muslim scholars who possess the ability of setting grounds for righteous legal 
deliberations, and finally the “Qiyas”, using the analogical deduction whenever Quran 
and Sunna are ambiguous (Mandeville, 2007, p. 35).  
Following the two great dynasties, the Ottoman empire came in 1517 with their Sultans 
claiming themselves the Caliph, and within time it became known as the “preeminent 
political authority of the Muslim world” (Mandeville, 2007, p. 42). Later, as a result 
to the growth of the imperialist powers in Europe, and their ambitious seek after the 
area with Islamic concentration, revivalist Islamic power grew as the Salafi founded 
by Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab trying to return to the Islam practiced during Prophet 
Muhammad and which, until today, has a strong influence on the Muslims and 
Islamists. Another reformist power contrasting Ibn Abul Wahab’s was then founded 
by Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani, followed by Islamist activists and intellectuals. Hassan 
al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, brought messages of anti-
colonialism and refute of Western influence, while Sayyid Abu’l-A’la’ Mawdudi 
created, in Pakistan, another movement bringing modern Islamism ideas, the Jamaat 
Islami, always rejecting the colonialist movements and called for the reintegration of 
“True Islam”.  
The correlation of Islamists with Democracy has originated many analyses. Some 
writers sought to highlight the reasons behind the failure of Islamism to cope with 
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democracy, like Bernard Lewis believed that the problem lied in the inherited Tribal 
attitude of Islam, which resulted in creating a difficulty to apply democratic rule. Lewis 
also added another external reason to the inadequate rule in Muslim countries, the 
imperialist powers which drove the Islam to end its tyranny with “whatever means 
possible” (Lewis, 1996), to which also Gurdun Kramer agreed, stating that the political 
programs of Islam in the post-colonial era was mainly concerned in keeping the 
Islamic predominance and actions in the society rather than trying to seek “technical 
procedures” able to constitute a successful rule of an Islamic state. In contrast, 
Mohammed Elhachimi Hamdi, in his article Islam and Liberal Democracy, went back 
till before the Western domination in order to explain the Islamic failed governance, 
believing that “Islam may have been misused and may continue to be misused by 
corrupt and tyrannical rulers’ intent on legitimizing their policies by giving them what 
appears to be religious sanction” (E. Hachimi, 1996). As for the contemporary 
Islamists, the current global interactive world poses new challenges. Like everyone 
else, Muslims are now opened to other cultures from different backgrounds and they 
are faced with new traditions crossing their Muslim heritage boundaries. Therefore, 
their people’s freedom is more accessible than ever before, and the inheritance of 
Western practices is no longer difficult, which urged many of Islamist parties, either 
to manipulate the interpretation of Qoran in a total rejection of external habits, or to 
follow an adaptive strategy, trying to cope with Western and international culture, 
keeping the Islamic practices as the main reference to Muslim’s behavior.  
In order to highlight the meaning of Islamism, Daniel Pipes wrote a study in 1998 in 
which he distinguished Islam from Islamism (Pipes, 1998). Pipes explained that 
Islamism is the complete adherence required from a Muslim to the sacred law of Islam, 
offering ways to control the state and the society. In the pre-Islamic Arab society, an 
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unorganized rule with no judicial system to set the basics of governance reigned. 
However, with the rise of Islam with Prophet Muhammad, a new trend of rule began 
to appear in line with laws set in the Qoran, with a command of a just arbitration. Still, 
the application of this rule and the arbitrations through the Qoranic jurisdiction were 
still a subject of controversy among Islam, as well as observers who analyzed the 
applicability of the latter.  
Bernard Lewis believed that the problem in the failed governance in countries with 
Muslim majority lied in the inherited Tribal attitude of Islam, which resulted in 
creating a difficulty to apply democratic rule. Lewis also added another external reason 
to the inadequate rule in Muslim countries, the imperialist powers which drove the 
Islam to end its tyranny with “whatever means possible” (Lewis, 1996), to which also 
Gurdun Kramer agreed, stating that the political programs of Islam in the post-colonial 
era was mainly concerned in keeping the Islamic predominance and actions in the 
society rather than trying to seek “technical procedures” able to constitute a successful 
rule of an Islamic state. In contrast, Mohammed Elhachimi Hamdi, in his article Islam 
and Liberal Democracy, went back till before the Western domination in order to 
explain the Islamic falsified governance, believing that “Islam may have been misused 
and may continue to be misused by corrupt and tyrannical rulers’ intent on legitimizing 
their policies by giving them what appears to be religious sanction” (E. Hachimi, 
1996).  
As for the contemporary Islam and Islamism, the current global interactive world poses 
new challenges. Like everyone else, Muslims are now opened to other cultures from 
different backgrounds and they are faced with new traditions crossing their Muslim 
heritage boundaries. Therefore, their people’s freedom is more accessible than ever 
before, and the inheritance of Western practices is no longer difficult, which urged 
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many of Islamist parties, either to manipulate the interpretation of Qoran in a total 
rejection of external habits, or to follow an adaptive strategy, trying to cope with 
Western and international culture, keeping the Islamic practices as the main reference 
to Muslim’s behavior.  
1.2.1 Islam and Democracy 
Under the title of Islam and Democracy, many Political Scientists and scholars 
wrote about the correlation and applicability of one with the other. Some of them 
treated the topic in its wide scope by discussing the potential link between Islam and 
Democracy in general, like Brian Handwerk in his article, Can Islam and Democracy 
Coexist?, (Handwerk B, 2003) and John Esposito and John Vol (Esposito & O. Voll, 
1996) in their paper, Islam and Democracy. Other scholars discussed the link by 
focusing on a certain country where democracy existed along with a majority of Islam. 
Sharon Otterman studied the Middle east in her article, Middle East: Islam and 
Democracy, (Otterman S., 2003), and others like, Respini B. and Shahrasad H. 
(Respini & Sahrasad, 2010), Michael Buehler (Buehler, 2009), Dirk Trondle, and 
Bernard Lewis discussed the factual relation between Islam and democracy in Turkey 
and Indonesia.  
The norms of Islam are defined and read in the Quran. It is only the interpretation that 
differs from a person or group of people, to others, which had led to the emergence of 
many sects under the Islam itself, Wahbi, Hanafi, Salafi, etc… Therefore, how Islam 
understands the Sharia explains how much they are able to accept the adaptation of the 
latter with democratic norms. Brian Handwerk (Handwerk, 2003) believed that Islam 
does not reject democracy; “I think that Islam as a set of norms and ideals that 
emphasizes the equality of people, the accountability of leaders to community, and the 
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respect of diversity and other faiths, is fully compatible with democracy. I don't see 
how it could be compatible with a government that would take away those values”. He 
added that through history, the “self-governance” had some roots in Islam. Sharon 
Otterman (Otterman, 2003) affirmed the theory that Islam and democracy can coexist 
by explaining the factors that can make the latter a model for democracy. Otterman 
explained these factors by referring to the Quran that contains religious ideals 
supporting people’s representation and defined these factors by mainly two: factors 
existing in Islam as the Shura, and the consultative decision making and the principal 
of Ijmaa, the consensus. The problem according to Otterman is the legal aspects of the 
mentioned terms, and to what extent they represent a binding effect on Islamists. She 
also added another factor related to the Muslim’s acceptance of others and minorities, 
the constitution of Medina, quoting Muqtedar Khan, the director of international 
studies at Adrian College in Michigan, “The document sets down the rules of the 
community of Medina, as agreed to by Muslims and Jews of the city and grants equal 
rights to Jews and Muslims who follow its laws”. 
The link between Islam and democracy seems to enjoy a wide range of scholars 
supporting it, as John L. Esposito and John O. Voll (Esposito & O. Voll, 1996) who 
also found no reason for Islam to be non-democratic. They believed that if the norms 
of democracy are liberal governance, free elections, alternation of power, respect for 
freedoms and human rights, then any practicing Muslim will accept the mentioned 
norms within his religious obligations, and where any Muslim leading any kind of 
political affairs, should follow consultation, as mentioned in the Quran, an explanation 
that was contradicted by Huntington in his book, Clash of Civilization  
The position against Islam was seen in the debates about banning Sharia Law in in 
different states, criticizing Islam, defining it as the religion that could not accept the 
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other and unable to reach equality among its own people, calling it male-dominated 
ideology. This claim came to meet Huntington’s analysis in Clash of Civilization, 
(Huntington, 1996) where in his analysis of Islam civilization, rejected the ability of 
Islam’s culture to receive liberal ideals, individualism and democracy.  
In addition, a more moderate attempt was set to explain the inability of application of 
democracy in a Muslim majority world. Otterman had a detailed study of the matter, 
and she related the reason to external factors, outside the scope of Islam (Otterman, 
2003). According to the writer, the problem lies in the regional situation of the 
countries where Islam is powerful, like political manipulation of the Arab Israel 
conflict, and where democracy became associated to the west and against the 
aspiration of the Muslims. Others reasons were related to the community of these 
nations which has a long standing policy of Anti-US policy, and not to forget, the 
support of the west to the autocratic regimes in these countries. As for the religious 
ideals of Islam that stand against democracy, Otterman explained the power granted 
by Islam to women and the resulting imbalance of weight between them and men.  
Writings about Islam and democracy are abundant. Analysis of the possibility of 
correlation also exists. Some writers like Brian Handwerk, (Handwerk Brian, 2003) 
considered Turkey as a model, adding to them Indonesia, as one of the nation 
struggling to apply democracy after an authoritarian regime. Sharon Otterman 
considered other nations like Mali, Malaysia, Nigeria, ruling with a non-fully 
functional democracy. 
The democratic countries with Muslim majority have also been analyzed in order to 
elaborate the reasons behind the success of democracy in the latter. Some analysis 
explained the reason through the election law, and the fragmentation of Islamic 
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authority in civil society. Blake Respini and Herdi Sahrasad, (Respini & Sahrasad, 
2010) in “Indonesia, Islam and Democracy: a Perspective” considered Indonesia as a 
worthy example of a democracy produced by Islam. The reason behind the success 
was through the reform led after the collapse of the authoritarian regime of Suharto in 
1998. The reform was mainly concerning the institutions as well as the fragmentation 
of Islamist party, where the latter can only become legal “if it is registered with the 
justice ministry, includes women in at least 30% of central leadership posts, establishes 
nationwide leadership rosters, and has chapters in at least 60% of the country’s 
provinces, at least 50% of the regencies in the aforementioned provinces, and at least 
25% of the sub-regencies in the aforementioned regencies, according to the Indonesian 
Law on Political Parties No. 2/2008”.  
Turkey on the other hand was analyzed by Bernard Lewis (Lewis, 1994) paper. While 
Lewis believed that Turkey is the only democracy among countries with Islam 
predominance, he explained the reasons starting from the historical Ottoman Empire 
and its impact on the society, until the shift in the policy of Turks in dealing with the 
West. This application of democracy in conformation with Western norms was 
founded in the society within a cultural and economic change. Still, the respect of 
Islamic norms was always applied, but interpreted in what it serves the democracy in 
the country, “the ruler does not derive his authority from descent, and even God is the 
ultimate but not the immediate source of authority”. Another writer, Dirk Tröndle 
(Tröndle, 2007) treated Turkey’s democracy in his paper, The Islamization of Politics 
versus the Politicization of Islam. Tröndle related the reason of survival of democracy 
in Turkey to the separation of religious and secular matter, analyzing the whole 
historical process behind this ability to separate.  
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1.3 Thesis Question 
These writings and analysis treating the liaison between Islam and democracy 
showed that there is a strong possibility of co-existence. Through a proper 
interpretation of Islamic norms, a suitable control of Islamic party growth, and a wise 
association of Islam to rule within a right separation of Islam and secularism, 
democracy can be applied and Islamic countries can enjoy a large extent of freedom 
and self-representation.  
As for the Islamist Parties in Arab countries, recent analysis treating the correlation 
between the Post Arab Spring Islamist Parties and the democracy has been led 
concerning the new constitutional programs and amendment that were happening after 
the emergence of new governments following Arab Spring. Charles Kurzman in his 
article, Votes versus Rights, compares the amendment and the provisions favoring 
Islamic factions over non-Muslims with other provisions around democratic countries 
(Kurzman, 2012). In this scope, he explains that despite the non-democratic character 
of the new provisional constitution in Tunisia, banning non-Muslim from serving as 
president, the restriction has been adopted democratically; “Egyptians make laws for 
Egyptians, Tunisians make laws for Tunisians, and outsiders have no vote” (Kurzman, 
2012). Other relevant studies spoke about the same topic, treating not only the relation 
between Islam and democracy, but also the relation between the so-called democratic 
practices of the Muslim factions and the democracy around the world. Charles 
Kurzman and Ijlal Navqi pose the question of whether Islamic party would support 
democracy “even if it means sacrificing some civil rights? Or do you support rights, 
even if it means stifling democracy?” (Kurzman & Navqi, 2010) 
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Still, among the mentioned articles and analysis, there was no detailed study of the 
survival of democracy within a rule of Islamist party in Arab countries. The Study that 
is treated in this thesis concerns the Islamist parties and their ability to cope with 
democratic requirements, as well and to adapt their constitutions with the demands of 
those who made the Arab Spring. Despite the abundance of works, papers, and 
researches done in the Islamic field and its correlation with democracy, a study of the 
new Islamist parties programs is not well elaborated, especially in finding the 
applicability of democracy within their Islamic context. This study does not decide 
definitively the relation between Islamist parties in the Arab World, especially Tunis 
and Egypt, but it instead, highlights the Islamists’ attitude and practices with regard to 
democracy in the MENA countries. 
1.4 Methodology 
 In order to answer the question whether Islamist can respond to democratic 
demands and tailor their political performance in line with democracy, maintaining 
their Islamic ideology, this thesis addresses the questions on two different approaches. 
First, practices and manifestos of Ennahda and FJP are analyzed and measured against 
a set of democratic values, Index of Democracy. The second approach draws a 
comparison between Egypt and Ennahda’s ruling Islamists and successful Islamist in 
other country. 
The study focuses on the Islamist parties and Islamism more than Islam as a faith and 
principle, analyzing the winning Islamist parties in Tunis and Egypt. It first, 
throughout the second chapter, explains the historical formation of Ennahda party in 
Tunis as well as Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, highlighting the development of 
political role and explaining the main assumed reasons behind their victories after 
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“Arab Spring” and relative failures. It also addresses the constitutional text and 
principals of both parties in order to set a reference for their practices and the 
compatibility of their manifestos and declarations with their fundamentals. Chapter 
three follows a triangulation methodological approach in order to analyze the 
relationship between winning Islamists and democratization. This includes conducting 
a content analysis of electoral programs, speeches, and parties’ practices in Egypt and 
Tunisia.  The purpose is to reveal aspects of Islamists’ harmony and contentions with 
liberal democratic tradition and principles, focusing on a thorough explanation of the 
choice of democratic indexes. Chapter four addresses another comparative approach. 
Indonesia, considered a model of successful democracy is set as a scale to which the 
experience of Islamist in Egypt and Tunis are assessed, and through which, it can be 
predicted to what extent the practices of FJP and Ennahda intersect with the Islamist 
in Indonesia highlight the possibility of maintaining a strong political role and 
capability of governing.  
1.4.1 Democratic Norms 
This comparison is based on two pillars. First, it identifies a set of democratic 
indexes, as a non-variant factor, based on which, FJP and Ennahda practices and 
manifestos will be assessed.  Democracy constitutes the most discussed theme of all 
time, stemming from Greek origins meaning “the rule by the people”. Through its 
linkage with rulers, governance, freedom, and liberty many criteria were set to 
determine it, and each of them is, alone, subject to controversy. Michael Clarke 
published a study in which he described democracy as a contested concept (Clarke, 
2008). Clarke argued that democracy, throughout the history has witnessed an increase 
in constitutionalization process, due to which democratic norms became fundamental, 
but remained subject to contrasting interpretations. While international organizations 
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like the United Nations and European Union set democratic standards to be 
acknowledged around the world, many other scholars oppose this generalization of 
definition, and believe that democracy is variable and its definition depends on the 
society in which it is studied, quoting Hyland, “there is a deeply problematic paradox 
of the unquestionable value and unique legitimacy of democracy. Everyone supports 
to be in favor of democracy, but there is little agreement over what democracy is” 
(Hyland, 1995: 36). In the same context, David Chandler related democratic norms to 
social constructivism, arguing that democratic criteria do not only depend on societies 
and civilizations, but its promotion also depends on the period where the latter is being 
discussed. Accordingly, he defined three chronological stages, the early 1990’s where 
democracy’s promotion is linked to cold war victory or liberal ideals, the mid 1990’s 
where democratic norms are seen as “elite self-interests” product, and the after 2000 
stage where democratic promotion requires an external involvement in shifting 
societies (Chandler, 2011).  
Despite the controversial status of democratic norms, it was important in this thesis to 
set a static and non-variable reference of Democratic Index. Through searching for the 
internationally acknowledged democratic norms, there was accordance to a great 
extent, between Freedom House, United Nations and Economic Intelligence Unit on 
democratic norms. The only contrast that could be recognized in the methodologies 
used by these organizations to measure democracy; House of Freedom uses a 
dichotomous concept, that a state might either be democratic or not, depending on four 
main criteria, competitive and multiparty political system, universal adult suffrage, 
regularly contested elections, and public access to media, whereas EIU democracy 
index is based on five categories, electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the 
functioning of government; political participation; and political culture.  
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1.4.2 Comparison to the Indonesian Islamists 
This comparison is aimed at highlighting two main characteristics of the 
Islamists’ governance. First, based on the practices of FJP and Ennahda compared with 
that of the Islamist in Indonesia, the study will identify the possibility of the survival 
and success of the Arab Islamists. Second, it identifies, based on the differences 
between the parties in question, i.e. FJP and Ennahda with Indonesia’s Islamist, the 
reason behind the potential failure of these parties and the way to overcome it. 
Indonesia presents itself as a scale country to Egypt and Indonesia based on various 
similarities among the countries, the status of the Islamists during the autocratic 
regimes, the principles of the Islamists in each of the countries, and the nature of 
society, Muslim predominance. The fourth chapter elaborates the resemblance of the 
three countries on the level of the society’s struggle for democracy, rule under 
Islamists, and the reaction of the society to the latter. It highlights the path of Islamist 
parties in Indonesia from 1998, with the fall of Suharto, until today, depicting their 
influence in the county’s politics and explaining the reasons behind it. 
The result of this study brings to light, in an assumptive approach, the future of FJP 
and Ennahda in Egypt and Tunisia, and draws a broader image of the ability of 
Islamists to contribute to democratic rule. 
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2 Chapter Two 
 
Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda, 
History that would Shape a Future 
Before any attempt of studying the ruling Islamist parties in Tunis and Egypt, 
Ennahda and Muslim Brotherhood (MB), there is definitely a need to go back in 
history explaining their formation, their fundamental beliefs and practices which have 
allowed them, not only to perpetuate the political life of their countries, but also to win 
the elections following strict demands toward democracy and liberty. This chapter 
examines the history of both parties, since their foundation and until date, in order to 
reach a clear visualization of possible credibility in their claim for democracy while 
reaching the rule, following the Arab Spring. The history is followed by a thorough 
reading of articles and analysis written after the emergence of Islamist parties in both 
countries, Tunis and Egypt, enabling a better understanding of their set goals, and 
highlighting contradictions between their fundamental credos and pre-elections 
manifestos. This chapter constitutes the base of the study followed in the next chapter, 
especially while trying to correlate the statements and behavior of the ruling parties to 
the application of a democratic rule.  
2.1 Muslim Brotherhood 
Egypt’s political life is very active. Although it had been for many years under 
oppressive rules, its geopolitical situation transformed its people into political actors, 
struggling to re-define the ruling heritage of their country. Egypt is not only an Arab 
country, it was the one that witnessed the emergence of Arab nationalism with Nasser, 
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while it neighbored the everlasting Palestinian-Israeli conflict, playing many roles in 
the matter, mainly through 1967 war and Camp David Accord with Israel. 
Out of over forty active parties and movements, including secular, leftist, socialist, and 
religious parties, the main concern revolves around the Muslim Brotherhood which 
constitutes the energizer of Egypt’s new political life after Arab Spring through its re-
emergence under FJP. MB had played a key role in Egypt’s politics, either through 
acting directly in political life, when running for elections for People’s Assembly, or 
by affecting political changes in the country through their participation or accused 
participation in assassinations that had shaped Egypt’s history.  
2.1.1 History of Muslim Brotherhood 
 Founded in 1928 by the Egyptian Activist and School Teacher Hassan el 
Banna, Muslim Brotherhood became the largest Sunni Entity and “Influential 
Organization” in the world, creating interconnecting branches, by mean of Social 
Media or representatives. 
This Islamist socio-political organization was no longer restricted in its activity to its 
birth country, it rather had become widespread in all continents, varying in its practices 
from a country to another, holding all together the same credo.  
Muslim Brotherhood, since its birth and until date, was always active and had always 
been a key factor for rulers’ decisions in Egypt, taking different behaviors in shaping 
its work. During 1930’s MB kept an undercover attitude exercising its activity through 
infiltrating the Egyptian society. In 1944, this Islamist organization grew to reach more 
than two million followers, and played its first role in the Palestinian struggle, during 
1948, along with the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Muslim Brotherhood 
maintained an organized character practicing politics in Egypt, despite many security 
incidents including assassinations and attempts of assassination, accusing or involving 
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the latter. Still, whether in public, or undercover, this Islamist organization was par 
excellence adding to Egypt its political complexity, until the latest developments of 
Arab Spring, emerging itself as the leader, and representing itself not only in the 
People’s Assembly, but also in the presidency, through launching a civic political 
party, the Freedom and Justice Party.  
An interesting turning of event for MB is read in their history, the assassination of 
Egypt’s Prime Minister on December 28, 1948 by the latter’s member. This incident 
led to an apparent retaliation by which Al-Banna himself was assassinated. 
Furthermore, after the takeover of the presidency by Gamal Abdel Nasser, in 1952, 
MB witnessed a split between two ideological orientations. Hassan al-Hudaibi tended 
to work with Gamal Abdel Nasser in his seizure for a secular government, while 
Sayyid Qutb had a radical ideology advocating armed revolution against corrupt, 
including non-believers (non-Islam) in Western Nations. This attitude and the 
attempted assassination of Abdel Nasser in 1954 led to the abolishment of MB, when 
accused of perpetrators of Egypt’s security apparatus. More than thousands of MB 
members were imprisoned and punished, including Sayyid Qutb.  
Sayyid Qutb, MB’s most influential thinker after Banna was later executed following, 
again, an accusation of an attempted overthrow of Abdel Nasser regime, while his 
thoughts remained fundamental to MB. 
Following the loss of Sayyid Qutb, the re-emergence of Muslim Brotherhood came 
only after Sadat in 1970. This political role was granted to them by the President, only 
in order to fight the popularity of communist and socialist opposition parties. Still, 
despite the fact that Sadat was promoting a controlled public activity of MB in Egypt, 
being a signatory of Egypt-Israel peace treaty following Camp David Accord in 
September 1978 triggered the national feelings of Egyptian people, including MB, 
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standing always on the side of Palestinians. Sadat was assassinated in October 1981, 
and MB was the main suspect behind the plans to assassinate Egypt’s president. 
Following this act that exposed again a militant character, Muslim Brotherhood 
decided to start investing their power into political involvement. As a result, MB grew 
into one of the largest opposition group, where again, Mubarak exercised a strong grip 
over their participation, limiting the implementation of MB’s agenda in Egypt, through 
targeting the latter’s finance and imprisoning active members. In 2000, MB was able 
to win fifteen seats in the Egyptian Parliament, and then during 2005, they participated 
in the pro-democracy demonstrations led by “Kifaya Movement”, in a first attempt 
against the corruptive autocratic regime. A while later, MB reached a strong victory 
scoring 88 parliamentary seats in the People’s Assembly despite the campaign used 
against the latter, using the western concern against any growing Islamic power, 
relating it to Al-Qaeda. This anti-terrorism strategy urged MB candidates to rally 
independently, under the slogan “Islam is the Solution”. Following this huge success, 
1,000 MB activists were detained in prisons leading to a growing tension between MB 
members and Mubarak government, suffering pressure and limitation, until January 
2011, with the eruption of massive uprisings.  
De Kerckhove explained, in his policy update paper, Egypt’s Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Arab Spring, that MB did not directly join the demonstrations, 
and tried hard not to be misinterpreted in leading an Islamic Revolution, until later 
when its members played a direct role; “yet, MB members had a major role in fighting 
off Mubarak’s goons on Tahrir Square on February 2, when the Brothers took to the 
front lines and suffered the majority of injuries”. (deKerchkove, 2012). As a result, not 
long time after the topple down of Mubarak’s regime, Muslim Brotherhood emerged 
under the Freedom and Justice Party, as the strongest organized political group in 
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Egypt, not only winning in the People’s Assembly elections, but also representing 
itself through presidency.  
2.1.2 Principles of Muslim Brotherhood 
 Hassan el-Banna, founded Muslim Brotherhood on the main proclamation that 
“Islam should be given hegemony over all matters of life as mentioned in the latter’s 
website, under a militant credo: “God is our objective, the Koran is our Constitution, 
the Prophet is our leader, struggle (Jihad) is our way, and death for the sake of God is 
the highest of our aspirations”.  
A rule that is based on Quran and a state proclamation, founded on an Islam religious 
view, is what Muslim Brotherhood have been aiming for. In an interview with Deputy 
Chairman of MB Mr. Mohammad Ma’mun al-Hudaibi, Harvard International Review 
magazine was able to elaborate, to an important extent, the MB members’ point of 
view on how to apply Islam in their state. In his interview, al-Hudaibi explained MB’s 
two key pillars, the introduction of Shariah as the basis that controls the state’s affairs 
and society, and the work aiming to accomplish unification among Islamic countries 
and states, in order to liberate them from the imperialistic influence. According to al-
Hudaibi, applying MB’s model in Egypt wasn’t a hard task based on the fact that the 
majority of Egypt’s population is Islam who would comply with their practices to 
Islamic values and abide by default to its Shariah. As for the fight against external 
imperialist influence in Egypt, al-Hudaibi considered that MB was able to play an 
important role through history, starting with the liberation against the British 
occupation, not only in Egypt but also around the Arab world and Islamic countries. 
Despite this aspiration of having Shariah rule in Islamic countries, this would not affect 
the accountability of rulers, explained al-Hudaibi, where he saw a strong incorporation 
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of democratic values in this rule like justice, fairness, social and economic equality 
and protection of human rights, as expressed in MB’s fifteen principles. The first two 
principles highlight the value of representation and accountability, stating that the 
power is inaccessible unless by the consent of the people, always maintaining respect 
toward the power exchange through “free election”. As for the rights of minority and 
freedom of opinion, they were all explained through the five principles that followed, 
allowing the establishment of parties, the right for demonstrations and confirming “the 
freedom of opinion and the right to publicize it”, always respecting the “freedom of 
personal conviction”. In addition, the separation of power and judicial institution were 
widely detailed in both, the twelfth and thirteenth principle, while the ninth until the 
eleventh spoke about the equality of citizens and the right of everyone to “become a 
member of parliament through elections”. Concerning the protection of the country’s 
internal and external security, principle fourteen and fifteen explained the 
independence of army from political influence “and that it should not be used, neither 
directly nor indirectly, by the governing authority in enforcing its wishes and control, 
or in prohibiting the people’s rights”, as it should be also applicable on the police and 
security services.  
2.1.3 Freedom and Justice Party, Post Arab Spring MB 
 Despite the fact that the participation of MB at the beginning of the protests 
against Hosni Mubarak was shy, Egypt’s election came to validate their existence by 
receiving the majority of votes in both, People’s Assembly and Presidency.  
During the election, MB represented itself through a political party, the Freedom and 
Justice Party, winning in all the three rounds of Parliamentary elections, and taking the 
majority of the seats. The Democratic Alliance, which FJP was a part of, won 225 seats 
including 216 seats only for FJP. Other alliances including Islamist Alliance, with 
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three Islamist groups, the Egyptian Bloc with three parties, and twelve other parties 
and independents only received 55% of the Egyptian votes. Consequently, on 
December 2012, New York Times magazine published an article stating in which the 
victory of MB by calling the latter, Egypt’s “anti-colonialist movement”.  
Many scholars and political analysts tried hard to seek after the reasons that granted 
FJP this huge victory. Some believed the reason was the oppression exercised by 
Mubarak over the latter, especially using the boogeyman label that was given by the 
American, during their fight against Terrorism and al-Qaeda. Some others believed 
that MB was very much organized that it was able to penetrate Egypt’s society in each 
neighborhood and by then, mobilize a great majority of Egyptian’s on their side. As 
for de Kerckhove, he elaborated four reasons behind the rise of MB power, considering 
that the main reason lies in the inadequate military pressure used during Mubarak to 
counter the rise of Islamists in his country. Military, he wrote, had an inability in 
restoring security, and later, had an “overbearing control over an ineffective 
transitional civilian government”. Another long term reason was based on a legal 
aspect and constitutional amendments, putting to a referendum the Supreme Command 
of Armed Forces, and giving the MB the opportunity to call a “yes” vote for Religious 
Duty. De Kreckhove also added that MB itself was able, through its Freedom and 
Justice party, to promote its righteous behavior, by promising the Egyptian of not 
running for presidency, highlighting its “power sharing” slogan. 
On the contrary, FJP did not comply with its alleged promises. It did not only run for 
the presidency, but it also won the seat with a strong grip, that was later criticized by 
the Egyptian, comparing it to the previous autocracy with a non-secular agenda. As a 
result, FJP candidate Morsi became the president of Egypt, and his presidency came 
along with a price. The ruling attitude of FJP’s winning candidate lead to violent 
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situation, during which some of protestors held a banner saying: “Mubarak, come 
back, we were joking”.  
Despite the fact that Morsi was the president of Egypt after “Arab Spring”, he was not 
FJP’s first choice. It was Khairat el-Shater, a non-member of FJP, whose candidacy 
would have not affected the party’s pledge of running for presidency. Yet, el-Shater 
wasn’t able to run for presidency due to his legal status after being jailed during 
Mubarak from 2007 until 2011. This disqualification of el-Shater was cleverly used by 
FJP who chose Morsi, the Chairman of the Party, to continue the presidency battle. 
Still, the repetitive promises of FJP to apply democracy, never made secularists more 
assured, nor made them feel less threatened. FJP’s manifestos at the beginning of the 
presidency have been repeatedly contradicted in the streets of Egypt through indirect 
statements released by MB followers and supporters, declaring the victory of Islam 
and the “dream of Islamic Caliphate that was coming true”. These behaviors led the 
fear escalating on an international level, especially when the president himself was 
tackled through videos with offending comments about Jews and Christians upsetting 
Western sentiments. Following this incident, Morsi did not reject the videos, but tried 
to defend himself, saying that his speech was mainly against Israeli policies toward 
Palestinians.  
Nevertheless, Morsi also played at a later stage the biggest role that transformed 
Egypt’s seculars and oppositions’ fear from nightmare into reality. It was on the 22nd 
of November 2012, when Morsi issued a constitutional amendment that would have 
place him above judicial oversight.  His decree provoked Egyptians who went again 
to the streets, resulting in six dead people among protestors. Autocracy was again put 
in highlight; opponents of Morsi claimed that they had been captured and tortured by 
Islamists supporters on 5 December, 2012. The situation also got worsened when 
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Mosri’s constitutional amendment was ratified with 64 percent of the votes, triggering 
the sentiments of opposition who vowed to use peaceful means to reject the latter.  
On the 25th of January 2013, the Egyptian crises took a different shape. After 
celebrating the second anniversary of January uprising that had led to their Arab 
Spring, Morsi and MB’s opponents claimed that the latter have used the presidential 
power and betrayed their revolution through passing the constitutional amendment. 
The protests were escalated, especially after sentencing 21 local people to death 
following their role in the previous February’s incident that lead to a loss of seventy 
persons, caused by a fight that had erupted over a football match between al-Ahly and 
al-Masry. Connected or not, the protests increased all over the country urging Morsi 
to announce a “State Emergency” along Suez Canal area, placing MB in a very critical 
situation, under the accusation of betrayal. Consequently, the short lived presidency of 
Morsi ended up through renewal mass protests in the streets demanding the end of his 
tenure which met the support of the Army. The military through its head General Abdel 
Fattah Al-Sisi provisionally suspended the country’s constitution and declared the end 
of Morsi’s presidency. Since that date, MB’s supporters remained in a struggle against 
the new government under elected President Al-Sisi, facing by mass, different 
allegations and political trials.  
Their principles claimed democracy, but their historical attitude opposed it in many 
events, which caused a difficulty in correlating their popularity to the rights claimed 
during Arab Spring uprisings. As a result of the toppling of Morsi, MB has become 
banned in Egypt, suffering a continuous oppression and clashes with the government’s 
apparatus.  
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2.2 Ennahda 
Within a similar scenario of that of Egypt, Tunis was the first country to set the 
departure line of an Arab Spring. This country also possesses a complicated political 
life, and an ongoing dilemma among different political actor, of which, “Ennahda 
Party” which has re-emerged after the topple down of Bin Ali, winning the election of 
Constituent Assembly with a striking majority, ninety seats out of 217. Like FJP, 
questions about what Ennahda is, and why it was able to overwhelm the Tunisian 
elections became a topic of analysis for many political scholars, trying to solve this 
Islamic alienation of the Arab Spring’s people.  
2.2.1 Overview of Ennahda 
Ennahda is the most recent name that was adopted only after 1989 to an Islamic 
Movement in Tunis, known as Islamic Action which later took a party shape under 
“Movement of the Islamic Tendency”.  
This party was inspired by Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, had suffered the same 
oppression of its country ruler, and with a small difference of turn of events, the fate 
of Ennahda could be said the same of that of MB after Tunisian’s Arab Spring. 
Although it has its roots founded on Sayid Qutb’s ideology, Ennahda was also able to 
emerge itself under a more moderate Islam advocating democracy and recognizing not 
only pluralism in Tunis society, but also adopting more tolerance with the West.  
Like MB’s Sayid Qutb, Ennahda could be also characterized in a man, an intellectual 
who founded the latter in 1981, Rachid Ghannouchi, and who like many others, 
suffered from the oppressive attitude of Tunis’ regime under Bin Ali. This oppression 
was always using the same and most prominent slogan, “war against Terror”, while 
Ennahda – Islamic Tendency at that time – was the most threatening opposition force 
26 
 
in Tunis. This strong influence of Ennahda in Tunis pushed its ruler, Bin Ali, to take 
radical actions, through which, he jailed more than 25,000 activists and banned the 
party from participating in the elections in 1989. At the same time, Ennahda founder, 
Ghannouchi was exiled, and never turned back to Tunis, until the Tunisian revolution 
that led to the ousting of its president.  
After Arab Spring, and with the return of Ghannoushi on 11 January, 2011, Ennahda 
tried hard to promote itself as a moderate Islam, distancing itself from Salafis and 
extremists in Tunis. In order to reinforce their commitment in accommodating 
themselves with New Tunis after Bin Ali, Ennahda signed with the other opposition 
groups in the country a “shared statement of principles”. Their victory in Constituent 
Assembly also drove many analysts to rely on the single cause behind their victory; it 
was due a compassionate feeling of the society toward a party who had suffered a lot 
during the autocratic rule. Noah Feldman correlated the Win of Tunisian Ennahda to 
democracy who despite the fact that he compared the victory of Islamist to “puzzling 
disappointment for the forces of democracy”, he proved that this victory was predicted 
to a great extent. The reason was not only due to the inability of organizing the 
opposition before the election, the way Islamist and Ennahda were organized, nor the 
relatively short time between the beginning of democratic process and elections, 
Feldman analyzed a deeper reason, the one of disparity between vanguard and 
revolutionary masses, where he explained that “many Tunisians see Islam as a defining 
feature of their personal and political identities” (Feldman 2011). 
Despite the controversial existence of Ennahda victory along with continuous criticism 
of secularists in Tunis, Ghanouchi, in many occasions tried to assure to his society that 
his party would never follow Saudi Arabia model of Islam, nor that of Taliban, but, 
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they would rather try to adapt a more successful Islamic models, as the one in Turkey, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia, a model that could highlight a modern character of Islam.  
2.2.2 Ennahda and Elections 
 Elections in Tunis for Constituent Assembly was held on 24 October, 2011, 
after the Arab Spring uprising. Like Ennahda, many other parties were rallying for 
elections including secularists, and Islamists.  All these political groups were also 
participating in the oppositions against Bin Ali, and were definitely an engine for the 
latest demonstrations. Besides Ennahda, there was the Free Patriotic Union launched 
after the Tunisian uprisings by a 39-year old businessman, the Tunisian Workers 
Communist Party, a party that was founded since 1986, well organized and popular 
among student’s populations, in addition to Democratic Modernist Coalition, legalized 
only after 1993, after ending its support to communisms, and many others, reaching 
an approximate number of eighty.  
After re-gaining its legal status and becoming able to compete in Tunis’ Constituents 
Assembly elections, Ennahda worked hard on promoting itself to the Tunisian as a 
potent alternative to Bin Ali’s regime following Arab Spring uprisings. In a prior 
attempt to distinguish itself from Radical Islam, its party’s officials referred to the 
latter by Islamic and not Islamist. Still, despite all, some of the followers and members 
refer to themselves as Islamists and call their party, “God’s Party” (Lewis, 2011). 
Also, in an attempt to show openness to the west, members and high officials of 
Ennahda met with American figures, like when General Secretary Hamadi Jebali met 
with US Senators McCain and Joe Lieberman, adding to which statements stressing 
their commitment in fighting theocracy and applying democratic rule based on 
people’s liberty. Therefore, with a long term organization and hard work in a relatively 
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short pre-election period, the results of the elections held on 24 October 2011 were 
fruitful for Ennahda, winning 90 seats out of 217, an equivalent to 41 percent of the 
registered votes on that day.  
Other practices were also noticeably encouraging for democracy. Ennahda represented 
a female candidate who did not wear veil, offering a strong symbol of tolerance. 
Moreover, Ghannoushi in an interview with BBC, during his stay in his exile in 
London, highlighted his beliefs in a peaceful coexistence between Islam and 
modernity. His statement showed that his views were not related to a momentary grasp 
of the opportunity represented by Arab Spring, but had  rather been declared since 
1981,”… we have declared that we accept democracy without any restrictions and we 
accept the decision of the people whether they come with us or against us”. (Lewis A., 
2011) 
The post-election period was as hard as the pre-election on Ennahda party. Again, 
Ennahda suffered the critics of secularist, but this time, the critics were not only 
assumptive, but also based on some facts and practices that were viewed by some 
Tunisians, non-democratic.  
2.2.3 After Election 
On 21September, 2012, a critical article was released on “Green Left” web 
based newspaper, in which Patrick Harrison detailed some failing points of Ennahda, 
writing that this party was losing the confidence of those who rose against Bin Ali. 
Harrison in his article mainly spoke about the wrong steps made by Ennahda, like the 
appointment of Lofti Touatti as the director of Dar Assabah state-newspaper, without 
consulting with civil society leaders as it was promised. This act urged two hundred 
journalists to rally against the appointment on the 22nd of August 2012. In addition, 
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some reported the Minster of Foreign Affairs, on the 26th of August, 2012, saying that 
Ennahda had a goal to clean up the media, which, if true, could be against the alleged 
democracy. Not only statements were criticized, but also the behavior of the 
government was under scope of activists, where some saw that Ennahda hasn’t been 
doing noticeable difference in implementing its rule than Ben Ali’s, and where some 
others went to criticize its economic attitude, disagreeing with the declared attempts 
for taking loans from World Bank. 
Fears in Tunis against Ennahda seemed to be continuous; despite the promises renewed 
by Ghannoushi and the party’s members, Tunisians, and especially secularist are 
always doubtful of Ennahda practices, and their tolerance vis a vis Salfis and other 
Islamists who are always claiming and Islamic state.  
2.3 Conclusion 
 Whether Muslim Brotherhood or Ennahda, two Islamist parties reached their 
rule after an uprising, ousting two autocratic figures like Mubarak and Bin Ali. These 
two parties, similar in their origins, brought a similarity to the reaction of the street, 
especially the seculars, against them. Their credibility is always tested, and their 
statements are always doubted, making the analysis of their attempts for democratic 
application harder and harder.  
Studying Egypt democracy will remain more difficult, especially with the rapidity of 
the events that occurred after the constitutional amendments. The third chapter 
explains more closely the amendments of the constitution, as much as detailing every 
statement, in order to test a potential credibility of Ennahda and FJP in applying 
democracy.   
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3 Chapter Three 
 
Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda’s 
Approach to Democracy 
This chapter constitutes the core of the study. It highlights the actions that have 
been taken by the ruling parties of Egypt and Tunisia, their manifestos and agendas, in 
order to compare them with democratic values and behavior acknowledged 
internationally. Therefore, this comparative study requires a set of democratic indexes, 
against which FJP and Ennahda practices are measured. The information related to the 
FJP and Ennahda behaviors and declarations are mainly retrieved and collected from 
various web based newspapers, researches targeting the two parties, in addition to their 
websites.  
3.1 Democracy 
Democracy, as described in the first chapter, is a controversial term by itself. 
The approach followed in this chapter relies on qualifying a practice or a statement of 
either FJP or Ennahda and compare it against a set of norms, in order to measure their 
compliance to the latter. Regardless the constructivist theory and the subjective 
perception of democracy arguing that democratic norms are constructive and depends 
on the society in which they are applied, as it was explained by David Chandler in his 
paper, Promoting democratic norms? Social constructivism and the ‘subjective’ limits 
to liberalism, and supported by Michael Clarke, in his paper The Contested Meaning 
of the International Norm of Democracy. This chapter sets and follows the norms of a 
democratic rule as described and mentioned in the internationally acknowledged 
definitions within the International Law, International Convention on Civil and 
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Political Rights, declarations of regional unions, Human Rights organizations, and by 
the United Nations General Assembly, who since 1988, have adopted an average of 
one resolution per year related to democracy and its application, proclaiming the 
fifteenth of September the International Day of Democracy. 
3.2 Democracy Index: 
In order to define democracy indexes, there was a need to revisit the democratic 
values in their legal scope, as defined by international organizations, binding 
declarations, and ratified agreements. In the United Nations web based page 
concerning Global Issues, it was highlighted that despite the fact that the UN Charter 
did not mention the Democracy explicitly, still, the opening words, “We the People”, 
reflects the fundamental principle of Democracy, the will of the people. Moreover, 
always within the binding principles of democracy, the International Covenant of 
Social and Political Rights, in 1966, ratified until date by 167 countries, highlights 
under its articles 19, 21, 22, and 25, the fundamental principles of the freedom of 
expression, right of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, and right to elect and 
be elected.  
3.2.1 Free Fair and Regular Elections 
Under Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, it was 
declared that “everyone has the right to take part in the government of his county, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives”. Within this context, it should be 
also highlighted that democracy is not limited to one electoral or governing system, it 
rather is related to fair representation of people’s will, regardless the implemented 
machinery for this purpose. The implementation of the above principle is therefore 
applied through just electoral systems as well as free, fair and regular elections. This 
entails equal opportunities for parties and candidates, a balanced access to media, set 
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ceilings for the campaign expenditures, as well as free and equal access for voters. In 
addition, the secrecy of ballot, as declared by the Humans Rights Commission in 2002, 
in its resolution 2000/47, is one of the main pillars of democratic practice within 
election, in which the free will of people is exercised without any constraints or threats. 
The importance of election in the democratic process is highlighted by number of 
international organization besides the United Nations, which are working, individually 
or collaboratively to implement Democracy, citing of which, African Union, the 
European Union, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance1, 
the Organization of American States, the Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe, and the Southern African Development Community. (United Nations, 
[UN])  
3.2.2 Constitutional Limits on Government and Rule of Law 
This limit is only applicable through implementing a just rule of law, unable to 
be overruled by any person who is in power. The democracy web defines it as “the 
rule of law, not men” which restrict the absolute power of the state and suggests no 
amendments of constitution, under which no ruler can imply wars, or extend ruling 
terms, unless under the consent of its sovereign people.  
3.2.3 Minority Rights 
Under the rule of majority, through democratic votes, the minority rights should 
always be preserved. This requires genuine guaranty of the will of those who are not 
represented in the government. Those people represent a faction of the society, and 
their opinion should be respected and preserved by the majority’s representatives. 
Minority Rights was adopted by the General Assembly, on 18 December 1992, through 
                                                          
1 See www.UNDP.org 
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the declaration on The Rights of Persons Belonging to a National or Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities, through which the United Nations was able to setand 
promote standards to ensure equality and participation of group of people enjoying 
same ethnic, linguistic, or religious beliefs within a particular society. 
3.2.4 Accountability and transparency 
This principle of good governance, advocated by the Office of High 
Commissioner of Human Rights, and referred to by the Freedom House as Democratic 
Governance, claims transparency and accountability of the ruling government, through 
which, people can act against corruption and assess the legitimate rule which had to 
represent their demands when elected. This entails that the separation of power, 
legislative, executive and legal institutions must act independently, without any 
dominance of one over the other.  
3.2.5 Multiparty System 
Within the framework of democratic governance, people should possess the will 
to define themselves in the political realm. They are eligible to have a political and 
ideological identity and to act collectively with individuals who shares similar and 
same platforms. The competition among parties in democratic governance can differ 
from a state to another, depending on the electoral systems implemented in the latter.  
3.2.6 Freedom of Expression 
There are many speculations related to the freedom of expression. Some analysts 
defends the right of individuals to possess unconditional freedom for speech and 
expression, while others believe that this freedom should be controlled, or 
domesticated in order to maintain a certain order in the state or the country and avoid 
any threats towards the national security. It certainly is a controversial right of 
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democracy, but, whether a country wish to exercise any sort of control or protection 
of their nationals from uncontrolled speeches or expression that would influence the 
national order, it should be done within limits, in order to avoid any oppression or 
misappropriation of control. Freedom of expression, as incorporated in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, stated that each individual should have the liberty of 
expressing opinion, as well as to seek information. This freedom of expression allows 
individuals to access to all sort of media, press, and social, without the manipulation 
of governments who tend to exercise censorships over distribution of information, as 
well as harassing journalists and bloggers.  
3.2.7 Economic Freedom 
In the Democracy Web, Economic Freedom was described broadly as one 
essential factor for democracy to flourish. Under the same subject, it was also 
highlighted that there are no international covenants that would guarantee this 
economic freedom as a condition for the establishment of democracy. Many empirical 
studies concentrated on the correlation between democracy and economic freedom; in 
his article, Ian Vasquez, the director of the Projects on Global Economic Liberty at the 
Cato Institute, advocated that economic freedom is the main factor that 
counterbalances the political power and contributes to a pluralistic society. He also 
contradicted the claims of Civil Society actors who believe that economic freedom acts 
against Human Rights and political pluralism. Vasquez explained that the stronger is 
the economic freedom the wider is the space created for organization and civil society 
to grow and be independently funded. Although, while observing Singapore and Hong 
Kong, the high level of economic freedom did not induce any higher level of 
democracy.  
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3.2.8 Freedom of Association 
Freedom of association is the pioneer that lies behind the establishment of 
democracy. In order to acquire majority, and to express thoughts and beliefs within 
organization, or parties, or even small based gathering, the freedom to associate and to 
struggle for your right, to ask for your freedom when it’s withdrawn, and to rise against 
state’s tyranny should be sacred in democratic systems.  
3.3 FJP and Ennahda Practices 
 Before any analysis of both parties, Ennahda and FJP, and before falling into 
the predictions related to the future of Ennahda based on the failed attempt of Muslim 
Brotherhood to rule Egypt under FJP, there is a need to re-visit the practices of these 
two parties and try to conclude their relevance to democracy, to the demands of the 
Tunisian and Egyptian people during the uprisings of Arab Spring. The study also 
enables us, in the following chapter, through carrying a comparison with Indonesia’s 
emergence into democracy, to visualize the genuine reasons behind the fall of Morsi, 
and the ability of Tunisia to survive, until today, the opposition’s attempts to topple it. 
  
3.3.1 Freedom and Justice Party 
Following the first democratic election after the topple of Mubarak’s regime in 
Egypt, came the Muslim Brotherhood, under their FJP party, with striking results, to 
achieve a majority representation in the Constitution Assembly, and elect the 
president, Mohammad Morsi.  
This short-lived presidency posed a controversial debate in Egypt, which lasted until 
today. Currently, Egypt is divided among many factions. There are those who criticize 
Morsi’s tenure in presidency and blame his undemocratic approaches, those who 
believe that the coup d’état against Morsi is a military conspiracy and cannot do better 
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than the latter, and those who, despite their opinion rejecting Morsi’s tyranny, see that 
the events that have occurred in Egypt could not be avoided and may be considered as 
normal course of events.  
3.3.1.1 FJP Democratic features  
Being a party based on Islam and Sharia, possessing a history filled with 
contradictions and being oppressed and attacked several times by presidents who 
sought secular rules in Egypt, the position of FJP and its representatives became 
doubtful to Egyptians. 
Still, Morsi and other counterparts of the FJP tried on different attempts, through 
televised appearances, newspapers, social media, election program, and lastly the 
constitution, to assert to all Egyptians that their agenda was genuine and that, despite 
the fact that they aspire a law based on the Islamic Sharia, the latter would never 
contradict the democratic values and the freedom the Egyptian appealed for, during 
the Arab Spring uprising.  
On the economic level, FJP did not evoke any declaration related to banning alcohol2 
and its consumption, which could have contributed, to a certain extent, in the 
destabilization of the touristic sectors in the country. Despite this questionable 
tolerance to a non-Muslim practice, the president Morsi, at that moment, became the 
spotlight related to his guidance towards irresponsible drinking habits. FJP 
representatives reassured Egyptian investors and promised that the government was 
seeking participation. Osama Gado, a founding member of FJP, explained that his 
party is targeting a more regulated market in order to end monopolies, and would not 
change any of the State’s subsidies’ aiming at feeding the poor.   
                                                          
2See David Britain: The New Islamists: Pluralism and Minorities? 
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Analyzing FJP approaches and practices in Egypt, Nathan J. Brown reported that the 
FJP leaders were always invoking in their speeches “participation, not domination”. 
This approach was being challenged by the FJP’s Muslim rivals in the Egyptian 
political arena, where it became difficult for the party to decide whether to compete 
with the Salafis for the Islamists popular base by highlighting their Islamic tendency 
or to reassure the secular and the western world.  
In order to show their respect for minority, Morsi appointed twelve Christians3 out of 
ninety members in the Upper House of Parliament, and tended to show FJP’s tolerance 
for equality by including eight women. Morsi also appointed Mahmoud Mekki, a 
senior judge known for his fight to implement judicial independence as his vice 
president. He also, during a speech on the 14th of June, 2012, assured to the Egyptian 
that he would preserve all national and international agreements, protecting the rights 
of women and children, as well as Muslims and Christians.  
With regards to the freedom of speech, Morsi’s reaction to Muslims’ outrage against 
the video “Innocence of Muslims” was criticized. Still, this reaction was not strictly 
controversial to the Muslim Brotherhood. All around the world, freedom of speech 
became debatable whether attacks against religious figures should be tolerated or not. 
Morsi, in order to highlight his tolerance, and in a very concrete corrective measure to 
the violence that had erupted in Egypt, addressed all Egyptians and asked them to 
protect the western diplomatic representatives in Egypt, while offering his condolences 
to the American ambassador killed in Libya, in an outrageous reaction to the same 
movie. Also, in their election program, FJP promised the Egyptians that it would 
“safeguard for every Egyptian, fundamental rights and freedoms” (Ikhwan web). This 
                                                          
3See Leila Fadel: Morsi Wins and Losses after Egypt passes draft constitution 
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entailed the freedom to form and join political parties, as well as to be organized in 
unions and syndicates. It also covered the freedom of belief and the liberty to practice 
it. The FJP program also included a paragraph detailing the importance of woman in 
the society, “wives, mothers, and makers of men” encouraging their education, 
support, and provision of a just social right.  
According to many Egyptians, these democratic practices and themes came to be 
contradicted by the aspiration of FJP to found the Egyptian constitution on Sharia Law. 
Based on an article retrieved from Ikhwan web, FJP tried to defend their inclination to 
Sharia law by describing it as the “most important component of the Egyptian 
personality”. The article highlighted that the Sharia is a determinant of the Egyptians, 
identity, and even for non-Muslims, it doesn’t not contradict with any democratic 
aspect, since it is a culture and requires equal citizenship, quoting al Quran 49:134; 
“made you into nations and tribes, so you may get to know one another”. According 
to the same source, the Ikhwan web, the defense of Sharia came to define it as an 
improved law system than the man-made, and that it would safeguard the rights and 
rites of non-Muslims. Nathan J. Brown, in his paper, When Victory Becomes an 
Option, highlighted the FJP’s tendency to opt a less robust Islam-based language, and 
explained that the expression stipulating that Sharia’s principles are the main source 
of legislation could not be self-enforcing, and that its implementation will be strictly 
linked to the Parliament and the executives, and not to religious scholars.  
  
                                                          
4 See: http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30353 
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3.3.1.2 Undemocratic aspects of FJP governance  
Despite FJP’s repetitive attempts, on different occasions, to highlight their 
tendency to a democratic Egypt, they were not able to alienate themselves completely 
from their party’s foundation, the Islamic Sharia. It was very obvious that this 
foundation is not only the basis of FJP’s members to join, but it rather is an 
incorporated belief that cannot be simply abandoned. This belief, and the obvious 
differences among the FJP’s members, weakened the credibility of Morsi, and 
affirmed many secular’s fears.  
Yasmine Saleh, a Reuters reporter posted in Cairo, explained that FJP have always 
been unclear about their policies, reporting Said Nabil Abdel Fattah, a researcher in Al 
Ahram Center for political and Strategic Studies. A Christian website, On Coptic 
Nationalism, published an article analyzing the brotherhood’s election program. In 
their article, they highlighted a hidden Islamic agenda that would contradict all claimed 
democratic approaches. The article started with accusing the FJP of subterfuge and 
later continued with criticizing the translation of the document into English, explaining 
that the outcome came delineating from the original Arabic text, concealing their true 
undemocratic tendencies. As an elaborative example of the contradictions, the 
women’s right as described by FJP in their program opposed strictly the women’s 
duties in society. In a tricky exercise of democracy, as reported by haaretz newspaper, 
many Muslim parties, amongst which the FJP, tried to introduce female candidates in 
their electoral lists, only relegating them to low places on the lists.  Also on the same 
electoral program, Brown explained that the aspiration of FJP to build an economical 
system compliant with Sharia was less clear. Another Coptic attempt to highlight the 
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undemocratic practices of FJP was through a published article under Coptic literature5 
where it analyzed the contradiction arising from FJP claiming equality between men 
and women and later linked its application to the Sharia. The comment came to 
criticize the article stipulating the insurance of women’s access to all their rights 
consistent with the values of Islamic law and maintaining the balance between their 
duties and rights, by highlighting that it is “abundantly clear that the Muslim 
Brotherhood do not see women rights as natural and inalienable. Their rights must be 
restricted by Sharia and their duties in society; duties which are in themselves dictated 
by Sharia”. The opinions against FJP were not only expressed by the Christian 
community in Egypt, but rather were expressed by seculars and Muslims who saw that 
the introduction of Sharia in its legal aspect as a biding law contradicts democracy. In 
addition to the interpretations of Morsi’s hidden agenda and the analytical approach of 
theoretically delinking democracy to Sharia Law, the Speeches, programs and 
declarations showed, to a large extent, that FJP was unable to comply with democratic 
values. Despite the attempts of some FJP members to defend the position by basing it 
on the assumption of Egyptians opinion by not wanting a minority to rule them went 
in vain. On an international account, Morsi had made a mistake criticizing the Zionist 
and making no difference between them and the Jews by calling them bloodsuckers 
and descendant of apes and pigs during his speech addressing the Palestinian cause. 
During his presidency and after the liquidation of the video related to this declaration, 
Morsi tried to explain that this statement was addressed to Zionist and not the Jews, 
noting that the MB’s position on the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was becoming more 
tolerable despite the fact that Hamas perceives MB as the mother movement, as 
                                                          
5 See: http://copticliterature.wordpress.com/2011/12/15/the-position-of-the-muslim-brotherhood-on-
women-and-children-analysis-and-critique-of-the-fjps-parilamentary-election-programe-2011/ 
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described by Brown in a Congressional Testimony by the “emotional attachment” 
(Brown, 2011). 
The list of practices made by the FJP in general and Morsi in particular, able to revive 
the Egyptian sentiments of oppression and autocracy, kept on rolling. New York Times 
in a published article on January 29th 2013 discussed the complaints of some Egyptian 
against Morsi’s attempts to dominate the politics of the country through selecting five 
ministers from FJP and excluding the cabinet members from major political parties. 
The practices of FJP came in many times less assertive to the Egyptian as was 
described, and was concluded by the constitution draft that Morsi attempted to pass, 
and which later became the epic of the Egyptian political crises, turning the page to a 
new political period underlining more debatable aspects on whether Egypt could ever 
gain its democracy, now, under military. State-run media reported that Morsi’s 
constitution had passed a 64 percent preliminary vote. This poll, regardless how 
democratic it might have seemed, despite some critics that emerged from legal 
analysts, was very soon contradicted by the Morsi presidential amendment which 
granted him a status above the law, a status that would throw all democratic aspiration, 
from autocratic Mubarak, to an MB autocracy. Mervat Ahmed, an Egyptian activist 
reported by the Guardian newspaper, described the constitution as a coup on the state 
institution. The newspaper also reported Samir Morcos, a Christian presidential aid 
blaming Morsi’s reluctance to pass the charter without consulting his aid, and defined 
the move as undemocratic. Those constitutional amendments erupted demonstrations 
against Morsi and the FJP, despite the attempts of the latter to rectify or modify some 
of the clauses. Morsi appealed for unity and demanded in a televised speech to respect 
the one-third of the voters who voted against the charter. He went to describe that the 
differences of opinion vis-à-vis the constitution are a “healthy phenomenon” for 
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democracy. It all ended up by the end of his tenure, a short lived rule that concluded 
many hope for Egyptians in particular and others who believed FJP would constitute 
a model for Islam’s democracy.  
As the table 1below shows, FJP presented partial compliance in three democratic 
indexes, the Constitutional Limits on Government and Rule of Law, Minority Rights, 
and Multiparty system, while failed to ensure the application of six other democratic 
indexes; the table sums up the main events occurring during the MB’s governance.  
Table 1: FJP compliance with Democratic indexes, retrieved from News articles. 
Democratic Index  Democratic  Non-Democratic  
Free Fair and 
Regular Elections 
 New constitution was rushed through 
parliamentary approval and a 
referendum 
Constitutional Limits 
on Government and 
Rule of Law  
 
 President announced a state of 
Emergency in three cities along the 
Suez Canal: Port Said, Ismailia and 
Port Suez. He ordered a night-time 
curfew to stay in place for 30 days. 
. 
Morsi, issued a new constitutional 
declaration ruling that all laws, 
decrees and constitutional declarations 
issued by the president since he came 
into office on June 30 are final and 
unchallengeable by anybody.(Xinhua 
net) 
Minority Rights 
 
Morsi vowed to "protect the 
rights of women and children," as 
well as Christians and Muslims 
alike. (CNN News) 
The election law allows a 
parliamentary candidate to run as an 
independent, or on a particular party’s 
list, and then join still another party 
after the election votes are tallied. 
(Haaretz) 
Accountability and 
transparency 
In June 2012, after an election 
that international monitors called 
credible, Mr. Morsi was declared 
the winner of the race. (NY 
Times) 
 
Multiparty System  
 
Dr. Mohamed Morsi, Chairman 
of the Freedom and Justice Party 
(FJP), stated that: The majority in 
the upcoming parliament will 
form the government, which will 
be a coalition 
government.(Ikhwanweb) 
Morsi calls the Jews "bloodsuckers" 
and "descendants of apes and pigs."   
(American Thinker) 
 
Freedom of 
Expression  
 
Morsi was against the outrage 
against the Movie Innocence of 
Muslims  
 
Fierce clashes erupted between 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) 
members and its opponents outside its 
office in the Nile Delta city of 
Damanhour. (Xinhua) 
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Economic Freedom  
 
Morsi did ban alcohol: David 
Britain: The New Islamists: 
Pluralism and Minorities? 
In Egypt where tourism plays an 
important role in the country’s 
economy alcohol consumption, bikinis 
and mixed bathing at beaches are 
being reassessed. (blogs.lse.ac.uk) 
Freedom of 
Association  
 Egyptian protesters clash with police 
after Morsi decree. (Guardian) 
Women rights 
 
 The new law, which was authorized by 
the Shura council (this body functions 
as a parliament), holds that lists of 
parties vying in the parliamentary 
elections do not need to have female 
candidates in their top spots. 
HAARETZ.  The constitutional 
committee in Egypt included no 
women. 
blogs.lse.ac.uk 
 
3.3.2 Ennahda 
Being rooted and linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, Ennahda’s political path 
after the Arab Spring took a similar turn to that of the latter. The two Islamist based 
parties came with a striking victory following the toppling of two autocratic regimes, 
though, after taking over the rule,it witnessed different destinies. While the FJP is 
attacked in Egypt, its president is going under trials, and many of its supporters are 
detained, Ennahda still resists all attempts made by the opposition to withdraw the rule 
from their grip. The reasons behind the survival of Ennahda can be debatable, some of 
its members explains that it lies mainly in the practices of Ennahda to demonstrate to 
the Tunisian their tolerance for democracy, others believe that the MB’s fate in Egypt 
was a lesson learned, and others believe that Ennahda uses a smart tactic, in every time 
it produces an undemocratic statement or practice, it directly counteract with a 
democratic practice aiming at masking its mistakes.  
3.3.2.1 Ennahda Democratic Features  
Like the FJP in Egypt, Ennahda was subject to the attacks of the seculars in Tunis 
who also predicted that Ennahda would not differ from other Islamists and would 
certainly try to implement an Islamic law in an attempt to create an Islamic nation. 
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Despite these claims and accusations, Ennahda’s practices came more aligning to their 
manifestos and declarations. This behavior stemmed from the established internal 
organization of the party, which did not demonstrate many contradictions among its 
members, especially towards their lien with the Salafists in Tunis; philosopher 
Jameleddine Ben Abdeljelil said that the party has developed internally enabling itself 
to work a constructive role in a pluralistic and democratic system. In addition 
Abdeljelil, reported by the web based journal, Quantara.de, explained that Ennahda’s 
ability to cope with democracy relies on their belief that the political Islam is not static 
and on their consideration that the higher aims of the Sharia takes into account historic 
changes. The Salafims in the country poses its heavy burden on Ennahda, with their 
aspiration to establish the Muslim Nation and introduce Sharia Law in the Tunisian 
constitution. Unlike MB who fell in this trap, Tunis Ennahda did not want to be caught 
in the same controversy of defending Sharia. Instead, Ennahda declared on repetitive 
attempts that it was not willing to introduce Islamic Sharia in the constitution, on which 
53 senior officials of the party agreed. Ghannouchi, the co-founder of Ennahda 
movement states that despite the fact that Tunisian want democracy, they obviously 
don’t aspire a western democracy, claiming that the French model of democracy is the 
main reason on which critics are based against Ennahda practices.  
In its attempt to show its respect for diversity, Ennahda tried to establish a broad-based 
unity coalition and avoided the FJP mistake by appointing an Ennahda president 
despite their victory in the Constituent Assembly. Said Ferjani a leader within Ennahda 
was reported by Fawaz Gerges, a professor at the London School Economics and 
Political Sciences, saying that “history will judge his generation of Islamists not on its 
ability to gain power but rather on what it did with that power”. As for the respect 
towards women and its equality in the Tunisian society, Rachid Ghannouchi stated in 
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an interview held in 2011 that the FJP were prisoners of the regressive dogmas on 
woman, based on their selective spiritual interpretation of Islam. Also the members of 
Ennahda always pledged to promote the equal opportunities in the employment and 
education of women, and their free will to either accept or reject the Islamic dress. 
Rory Maccarthy, in his article published on “Open Democracy” web page, reported 
Ennahda’s announcement of enshrining the Personal Status Code related to the 
protection of women’s rights from polygamy and ensuring their equality as a 
fundamental law. This practice, as much as it seems democratic, came after long 
debates on the level of the streets and among the political actors, especially that female 
members of Ennahda were the first ones to tackle the laws protecting women. Amal 
Al-Hilali wrote in Al-Arabiya news that Ennahda statements related to women’s laws 
were conflicting. While Souad Abdul Rahim, a constituent assembly candidate “who 
topped the list of Ennahda” during the first parliamentary election, attacked the law 
protecting women who have children outside marriage, Ali el Areed, a member of the 
same party’s executive office “stressed that there was no reason for worry”.  
Another democratic practice could also be perceived, the resignation of Tunis’ Prime 
Minister Hamadi Jebali, Ennahda member, following the assassination of the 
opposition politician Chokri Belaid. Although, the decision to resign did not enjoy the 
approval of other Ennahda members especially that the plan of the PM was to form a 
technocrat cabinet, Hamadi Jebali declared his resignation 6  after the public rage 
against Ennahda, and was consequently replaced by Ali Larayedh. Despite the turmoil 
arising from the assassination, Ennahda leader did not respond to the request of the 
demonstrating people, neither to its member Jebali, and instead, declared that the 
incident did not involve Ennahda. Still, the other killings of two seculars in Tunis 
                                                          
6See: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21508498 
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during Larayedh’s tenure urged Ennahda to compromise with the main opposition in 
Tunis, relinquish its power, and contribute in the formation of a government formed 
by technocrats, led by Mehdi Jomaa. This attempt of participation especially in the 
drafting of the Tunisian constitution could be considered a positive practice towards 
democracy, regardless whether Ennahda only exercised it in order to avoid a destiny 
similar to the FJP in Egypt, or because it felt weak and wanted to grab the chance to 
remain in power. The resulting draft constitution, which came to light after two years 
and three months following the elections, was welcomed by the Tunisians especially 
that its drafting process was under watchful eyes, as reported by al-monitor website. 
This constitution appears to be responding to the aspiration of Tunisians, especially 
that in its preamble, it states that it takes pride in the struggle of the people to gain the 
independence and commits itself to eliminate autocracy and achieve free will. The 
mention of Islam in the preamble came as a reference to its heritage of principals and 
not as a binding nature, highlighting the human values of Islam along with the 
principles of universal human rights. This constitution also guarantied major changes 
and ensured women equality, especially with the adoption of clauses that ensure 
women equal representation and protect them against violence, despite all the debates 
arising from Ennahda’s first inclinations to propose offering housewives pension, stop 
the support for single mothers and re-introduce polygamy, making Tunisia the first 
Arab country to adopt such jurisdiction. In this regard, it should be noted that 
Ennahda’s female lawmakers count 41 out of 90, as reported by Nassima Kottoor, from 
BBC news. 
Despite the success of the constitution draft, many Articles were at heart of debates, 
especially Article 6 stipulating the state’s protection of religion and prohibiting 
charges of apostasy, Article 33 related to the parity in representation of women in 
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elected assemblies, and Article 38 related to the constitutionalization of the arabization 
of education, as reported by al-monitor web based newspaper. Many analyses 
discussed the new born constitution in its juristic framework, and Article 6 came to be 
the most controversial. Amna Guellali, director of the Human Rights Watch office for 
Tunisia, wrote in her article, the problem with Tunisia’s constitution, that Article 6 
suffers inconsistency which interpretations might result in “grave consequences” 
undermining human rights. Guellali stated that the contradictions arising from the 
state’s commitment to protect the sacred places and its rejection of appeals against 
apostasy can be interpreted differently and can also be used a tool by the authorities to 
impose “moral order” and undermine liberties, especially that Ennahda has ever 
introduced the bill related to a draft law criminalizing the offenses against the sacred 
value in the National Constituent Assembly on the 1st August 2012, which erupted 
great concerns for the Tunisians, expressed in their published article: Tunisia: Prison, 
Fines for Offending “Sacred Values”. 
Despite their claims for democracy and their generous contribution to cooperate with 
other political activists of the Tunisian society to the drafted constitution, many 
activists in Tunis are still following Ennahda’s steps and waiting for it to slip, just like 
FJP did. According to these activists, Ennahda’s beliefs are hindered by their decorated 
democratic practices and that their rejection to the killings of Choukri Belaid and 
others are not completely genuine using the Salafism as a cover to their Islamism and 
Islamic aspirations. Although it faces the same controversy of FJP, the practices of 
Ennahda showed more ability to cope with democracy, as shown in the below table 2 
and which was translated in their ability to survive until date despite the unrests in the 
country. 
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3.3.2.2 Undemocratic aspects of Ennahda governance  
The critics against Ennahda practices targeted different aspects of their rule, 
starting from the economic situation of the country, to some declarations against 
women’s rights, until the accusations of the killings, either directly or indirectly by 
blaming the party’s presence in the rule to be the ignition of such assassinations.  
Nils Naumann a writer in the Arab World reported the so called “political limbo” of 
Tunisia’s spring. In his article, Naumann explained the economic burden lived by the 
Tunisian after the revolution who believed that the politicians got their jobs, and left 
the people with the tragedy. He also reported the sentiment of the Tunisians, especially 
the seculars who blamed Ennahda’s presence in the government for the killings of the 
leftist oppositions, concluded by the assassination of Mohammed Brahimi at the end 
of July 2013. Rachel Shabi, in her published article in the “Guardian” reported 
people’s sentiments with regards to the assassination of Chokri Belaid; Jalila Hedhli-
Peugnet, a president of Think Ahead for Tunisia, in an attempt to highlight the failure 
of Ennahda’s rule, said that Belaid was not assassinated during Ben Ali’s tyranny, but 
was rather killed during post-revolution era, under the “democracy of Ennahda”.  
On another account, and within the same turmoil arising from the assassination of 
Belaid, Ennahda’s nomination for Larayedh stimulated agonizing sentiments of the 
Tunisian, since Larayedh was heading the Ministry of Interior, which according to the 
opposition, was responsible for the killing and the violence in the country.  
Tunisian opposition tackled Ennahda on many other levels of failure to apply 
democracy. Some of these claims were backed by Human Rights Watch organization, 
and some others were supported by statements from Ennahda members. It though has 
to be mentioned that some of the statement cannot be used to accuse the rule of 
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Ennahda of being undemocratic; like every party or political movement, members tend 
to possess different opinions, especially on controversial topics that intrigues the 
question of beliefs. Souad Abderrahim, a female member of Ennahda challenged the 
law protecting the women who have children outside the marriage, and Ali Larayedh, 
the previous Prime Minister of Tunis stated that his party was not willing to change 
existing laws based on Islam, like the polygamy and inheritance, claiming that this law 
is not against democracy, it rather stemmed from the nature of society in which the 
law is applied. All these statements were not fully adopted by Ennahda, and the drafted 
constitution came to oppose them.  
Table 2: Ennahda compliance with Democratic indexes, retrieved from News 
articles. 
Democratic Index  Democratic  Non-Democratic  
Free Fair and Regular 
Elections 
the first round of the 
presidential election would be 
held on Nov. 23 and a second 
round, if necessary in the event 
no-one gets at least 50 percent 
of the vote, at the end of 
December. (REUTERS) 
 
Constitutional Limits 
on Government and 
Rule of Law  
 
53 senior Ennahda officials 
voted in favor of the motion to 
keep sharia out of the 
constitution (arab news) 
 
Oppose naming Islamic law, 
or Sharia, in the new 
constitution, (Jordan Times) 
 
Minority Rights 
 
Unclear Position Unclear Position 
Accountability and 
transparency 
Prime minister resigns after 
the assassination of the leftist 
politician Chokri Belaïd 
(Guardian) 
Ennahda was accused of coddling 
ultraconservatives, known as Salafis, 
some of whom have been tied to a string 
of violent episodes. (NY Times) 
 
Multiparty System  
 
coalition government  
Freedom of 
Expression  
 
 Escalating political violence (The 
Guardian) 
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Economic Freedom  
 
Ennahda promised to create 
590,000 jobs within five years, 
increase investment, cut 
inflation and push annual 
economic growth up to seven 
percent from 0.2 percent 
estimated growth for 
2011.(Open Democracy) 
 
Freedom of 
Association  
 
  
Women rights 
 
The document also pledges to 
protect the freedom of women 
against any imposed dress 
code.(AFP) 
Ennahda has pledged to uphold 
civil and women’s rights. (The 
Guardian) 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 It is obvious that Ennahda and FJP embraced democracy on different levels 
(table 3). And it is also obvious that the failure in the application of democracy in 
Egypt was based on the FJP’s aspiration to build a society founded on Islam’s Sharia 
and to introduce a new form of autocracy through the introduction of the constitutional 
amendment through its President member. Still, the experience of Ennahda, despite its 
Islamic tendency and its similarity to FJP, was able to overcome the challenges against 
its governance. Their practices were performed alongside with their statements, unlike 
FJP, and their attempts to broaden their cooperation with the opposition in drafting the 
constitution increased their chances of survival.  
Table 3: FJP and Ennahda comparative compliance with Democratic indexes 
Democratic Index  Ennahda FJP 
Free Fair and Regular 
Elections 
Relative Compliance Non Compliance  
Constitutional Limits 
on Government and 
Rule of Law  
 
Relative Compliance Non Compliance   
Minority Rights 
 
Unclear Position  Unclear Position 
Accountability and 
transparency 
Unclear Position  Relative compliance  
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Multiparty System  
 
Relative Compliance  Unclear Position  
Freedom of 
Expression  
 
Non compliance  Non Compliance  
Economic Freedom  
 
Relative Compliance  Non Compliance  
Freedom of 
Association  
 
Unclear position  Non Compliance 
Women rights 
 
Relative Compliance  Non Compliance 
 
At this stage, the opposition’s claims against Ennahda remain theoretical but doesn’t 
mean false. The strategy followed by Ennahda is still misleading. Their compromise 
to form a technocrat government through coalition can be considered as a genuine 
exercise for democracy and response to people’s will, but also can be an attempt from 
Ennahda to look moderate and the godfather of pluralistic rule, until the right time 
come to catch the rule with a firm grip.  
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4 Chapter Four 
 
Indonesia, an Islamic Model of 
Democracy? 
The controversial potential marriage between democracy and Islam dates long 
in the past and was studied and analyzed in different nations with Muslim majority. 
The main two countries that dominated the analytical arena were Indonesia and 
Turkey, who enjoyed to a great extent the praise of many western and eastern 
commentators who saw in their experience an example for the emerging Islamic 
democracies to follow. In this chapter, I chose Indonesia as a case study in order to 
highlight the differences and the resemblance of the latter with Egypt and Tunis. The 
three countries intersect in many occasions with their history and struggle to overcome 
an authoritarian regime that suppressed the liberties of the people. The history and 
experience after the emergence of post authoritarian rule differs from one to another, 
which also enables us to highlight the potential reasons behind the success of 
democracy and its implementation in Indonesia, whether through Islam or through 
secular parties and to define the shortfalls in the Muslim Brotherhood’s governance, 
and the survival of Ennahda.  
4.1 Why Indonesia 
4.1.1 History 
 Like every country rising against authoritarian rule, its emergence into a 
democratic state is not an easy process. In many cases, the newly elected governments 
following the fall of authoritarian regimes failed to contain the people and respond to 
their demands, and in many others fell into the trap of insurgents who shifted the 
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process and worsened the situation of the country. The fate of these countries is related 
to many factors, internal, on both levels people and government, and external 
influenced by the geopolitical interest of other states. Therefore, a country like 
Indonesia poses itself as an important case study representing countries shifting into 
democracy, especially that it possesses the largest Muslim population, which makes it 
more interesting to study the existing relation between democracy and Islam, as well 
as political Islam. 
The democracy web described Indonesia as the country that spent most of its history 
being under monarchial or colonial, military or authoritarian rules. Indeed, Indonesian 
had throughout their history different sorts of oppression, the Dutch colonialism, the 
Japanese invasion, and the “New Order” ruled by the Indonesian president Suharto 
who was accused of authoritarianism that ended by his resignation in 1998 following 
the Asian financial crisis and its impact on the Indonesian economy. Like Egypt and 
Tunisia, the eruption of protests was initiated on a small scale and was later enlarged 
to contain many parties. The movements towards democracy started in 1996, through 
protests outside the meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
held in Jakarta, initiated as a result of a split in the ruling parties, and the Indonesian 
Democratic Party of Struggle, (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P) led by 
Megawati, the daughter of Indonesia’s first president, Soekarno. After the resignation 
of Suharto, his deputy, the interim president Habibi headed the country until the first 
parliament election in 1999 that brought Abdurrahman Wahid who only ruled until 
2001 following corruption allegations. Wahid was then succeeded by PDI-P 
Chairwoman, Megawati Sukarnoputri who ruled Indonesia until 2004. Although 
Megawati had dealt with important issues, especially the “landmark agreement 
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defusing Aceh rebellion”, 2004 election brought Susilo Bamabang Yudhoyono, known 
as SBY who had the longest tenure, for two ruling period, until 2014.  
4.1.2 Link to Egypt and Tunisia 
 Choosing Indonesia as a case study to compare the democratic struggle in each 
of Egypt and Tunisia was not random. The chapter is not only dealing with the success 
of democratic emergence after an authoritarian rule, but also the success of Islam and 
political Islam to merge and integrate itself in the new governmental equation of 
democracy, and be capable to cope with the change and adapt their political language, 
preserving a presence and role in the political arena. During Suharto’s governance 
most of democratic practices were violated by the regime through the state’s apparatus, 
where the criticisms against the government’s policy were prohibited. David Adam 
Scott in his article “Election Threatens Democracy in Indonesia” elaborated Suharto’s 
regime practices within the election campaigns whereby all candidates were screened 
before election and half of the members of the National Parliament were appointed by 
the president. In addition, democracy web in their published article “Ranking in 
Freedom in the World 2010” spoke of the brutality of Suharto’s regime similar to what 
was witnessed in Egypt and Tunisia during Mubarak and Ben Ali respectively. Also, 
like in Egypt and Tunis, Suharto used the Islamists to destroy political forces 
threatening his governance, the left and Communist Parties, and later turned against 
these Islamic actors after the 1970s. As reported by many political authors, Suharto 
gave no chance for Islamists to act and talk about political Islam and sought a 
weakening strategy through gathering the four major Islamic parties under one party, 
the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP). This practice 
was not only strict to Islamist, but also five major secular parties were gathered in one 
party, the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI), and only 
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Golkar party was granted engagement in politics to suppress politics, as described by 
John Riady in his article “Fifteen Years after Suharto, Indonesia Has Made Great Steps 
Forward”, published by the Center of Strategic and International Studies. On the same 
account, Joe Cochrane explained in his new York Times article, “In a Nation of 
Muslims, Political Islam is Struggling to Win Votes”, that the steps undertaken by 
Suharto to merge leading political parties had weakened the latter even after its oust, 
due to the difference of priorities and sometimes agendas.  
The end of the New Order regime opened the floor for Muslim activists to start their 
political race, and five of the Islamic parties won seats in the parliament, reaching an 
overall of 33 percent of the representation. The first parliament election in 1999 after 
the resignation of Suharto and the short governance of his vice Habibi, Abdurrahman 
Wahid, the head of the largest Muslim organization at that time, Nahdatul Ulama came 
as a president, a scenario that can also be considered similar to that of Egypt and Tunis. 
Although, unlike Egypt, Wahid contributed in the implementation of reform measures 
in Indonesia, his presidency was also short lived due to corruption and was later 
succeeded by his vice president Megawati in 2001. Following this impeach, Muslims 
were never again represented in the presidency in Indonesia, though they kept a certain 
influence on regional basis, as well as on a central basis through coalition with other 
secular parties.  
Another political aspect of Indonesia’s politics that resembled Egypt and Tunisia was 
the relative success of an Islamist party, the Justice and Prosperity Party (Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS). PKS’ founders had inspired their roots from the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood, and always campaigned for the implementation of Sharia law 
by democratic means, and only shifted its policy and language after the third election 
following Suharto’s resignation.  
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4.2 Indonesia’s Shift to Democracy 
4.2.1 Democratic Features of Post Suharto 
In most of the read articles, analyses, and papers, authors agreed that 
Indonesia’s shift to democracy is to be credited. Democracy web wrote that democratic 
roots has developed in Indonesia where the presidential elections after Suharto’s era 
were deemed free and fair, which is also endorsed by Freedom House who categorized 
Indonesia as a democratic country.  
There are many reasons behind this success, some based it on the nature of presidents 
who governed the country after Suharto, especially the former military, Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), as described by each of Paul Wolfowitz in his article 
“Indonesia is a Model of Democracy” writing that Mr. Yudhoyono’s leadership 
deserved a great deal of credit in bringing democratic success to “such a complex 
country, and David Adam Scott in his article, “Election Threatens Democracy in 
Indonesia”, who related Yudhoyono’s legitimacy to his practices and 
accomplishments during his first governance period in fighting corruption, and success 
in the economic arena, through which Indonesia surpassed its neighboring countries 
such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Australia in some exporting materials. Another more 
elaborative reason was the correlation between the success of democracy and the 
societal nature of Indonesia. Joe Cochrane in his article described the reason behind 
the success of democracy to the secular nature of the country. He explained that this 
secularism did not only emerge in the post New Order era, it rather was another re-
emergence from the first independence. Cochrane elaborated his argument by a 
historical event during the first constitution draft following the Independence from the 
Dutch colonial rule, where the Islamist demanded the inclusion of Sharia Law in the 
constitution and the declaration of Indonesia as an Islamic state.  The request made by 
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the Islamists was not welcomed by the other factions of the country, those who were 
from different religion as well as seculars.  
Although it is agreed by many that Indonesia has become an iconic state for the 
existing harmony between Islam and democracy, many other published writings 
criticizing the governance, like Malik Miah who argued that Indonesia still retained 
some anti-democratic aspects with regards to civil liberties rights, human 
development, fight against corruption, and rule of law. As a result of this politics and 
large Islamic base in the society, comes the question of the role of Islamist political 
actors in Indonesia of how much they contributed in its democracy, where do they 
stand, and where they will bring the future of Indonesia with their progress on societal 
and regional level.  
4.3 Political Islam in Indonesia 
Reported by Yenni Kwok in her article “15 years after the Fall of Suharto, a 
mixed Picture of Indonesia’s Minorities”, SBY declared in a speech in April 2013 in 
Singapore that his country has proven that democracy, Islam and modernity could go 
well together, and he went further to state that Indonesia could set guidance to the Arab 
Spring countries to follow.  
Jan Woischnik and Philipp Müller in their paper “Islamic Parties and Democracy in 
Indonesia, Insights from the World’s Largest Muslim Country” explained that political 
Islam in Indonesia only existed after Indonesia’s independence from the Netherlands. 
At a later stage, during President Sukarno and Suharto’s tenures, the political 
movement of Islam was suppressed, keeping their activity on a pure religious basis. 
This smart approach differentiated Indonesia from other Muslim countries, where the 
Islam was not declared as the “arch enemy of the reigning secular political elite”. 
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4.3.1 Islamist Parties in Indonesia 
Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Indonesia’s political Islam base is more wide and 
exotic; there are those who adopt the Pancasila7, the five foundational principal of the 
Indonesian State, those who tend to a more national secular ideology, keeping their 
religious identity, and those who retained a more conservative agenda for the 
implementation of Sharia Law and establishment of Islamic State. Some of these 
parties modified their stiff religious tendencies and adopted a more democratic agenda 
like the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN) and the Awakening 
Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB).  
Based on the study made by Mada Sukmajati, PAN is the most moderate religious 
party in Indonesia, established recently during 1998 and unofficially linked to 
Mohammadiyah. This party has even supported non-Muslim candidates and bases 
itself on the Pancasila principle; although modernist, PAN has been facing declines in 
the number of seats in the last three elections. Another moderate Islamic party in 
Indonesia is the PKB which, founded recently by during 1998 by five NU (Nahdatul 
Ulama) leader, it kept link to the latter. PKB contradicts with NU in its adaptation to 
the current Indonesia, adopting like PAN a national and secular ideology, advocated 
by the ex-President Wahid. Due to major disagreement that had emerged within the 
party’s members regarding their view of Islam, the elections’ results recorded a 
decrease in their representation in the House of Parliament, until 2014 elections where 
the party won 47 seats, an increase with 19 seats from the previous election. 
A major Islamic political player in Indonesia is the Prosperous and Justice Party (Partai 
Keadilan and Sejahtera, PKS).  This party is not as moderate as the previous two, 
although, in the past sixteen years, it has recorded an increase in winning seats in the 
                                                          
7 Five principles Philosophy of Human Rights, see: 
http://www.indonesianembassy.org.uk/human_right-2.htm 
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House of Representatives, while maintaining a balanced position between 
conservative Islam and urban Muslims. As a result of their latest support for the 
implementation of Sharia law, and despite their developed organization in the event of 
elections and preparation of their candidates, the party only won 17 seats, after 
registering 57 seats during 2009. Moreover, the United Development Party (PPP) 
which was the main Islamic party during Suharto’s era, under which major Islamist 
were forcibly merged, has followed a more conservative Islamic politics and replaced 
the Pancasila with Islamic ideology after 1998. This party is adopting a more 
conservative language with times, refusing the acceptance of other Islamic and 
religious partners in the country. It should be noted that the practices of the latter was 
not well received by the Indonesian people who expressed their concern during the 
elections. From 2004 until 2014, their representation in the House of Representative 
decreased with 19 seats, winning 39 seats during the latest polls.  
The more conservative the ideology of the Islamic party is, the less its representation 
in the parliament is, as the Crescent Star Party (PBB) which has centralized its 
campaign on the implementation of Sharia Law and until date, it was never able to 
register any representation. 
4.3.2 Role of Political Islam 
As a result of three historical and contemporary factors, the Islam’s 
predominance in Indonesia, the relative political oppression of political Islam during 
the Suharto’s New Order, and the success of secular parties to develop the country’s 
economy and democracy without hindering the religious freedom, Islamist of 
Indonesia tended to adapt their politics to a more open and flexible ideology, and 
increased more their focus on social and humanitarian activities.  
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Regardless the fact that Islamists in Indonesia could succeed in promoting their 
tolerance and despite their different attempts on several occasions to promote their 
openness and acceptance of democracy within their religious affiliation, as well as 
their capability of mobilizing people of Indonesia by playing the common beliefs card, 
the result in the elections did not reflect the aspired success.  
Some analysts interpreted the failure of the Islamists to win majority of seats in the 
House of Representative to the better ability of secular nationalist parties to compete 
with the Muslims in Indonesia on the economic level, political level, and even the 
societal level, where the language of the seculars, especially during 2004 election, 
included the acknowledgment of their affiliation to their spiritual belonging, the Islam, 
without introducing it in the political arena.  Indonesia’s Democratic Party (Partai 
Democrat, PD) did not only describe itself as national, but also added “religious” 
during its election campaign (Woischnikand Müller; 2014). Therefore, the tendency 
of the seculars not to alienate themselves from Islam made them potential rivals of the 
Islamist parties in the parliamentary election as well as the presidency. Also, the 
interpreter website published an article explaining the reason due to which seculars 
were able to win over the Islamist. According to this article, the seculars in Indonesia 
almost holds principles that resembles the Islamic ideology, only with more tolerance 
to accept others, through founding their parties on the Pancasila which states their 
belief in God, as well as through possessing religious wing, like the Baitul Muslimin 
(House of Muslims) of the PDI-P.  
Another major factor that contributed in the failure of Islamists in Indonesia lies in 
their historical merge under Suharto rule. The Merging of the Islamic groups during 
the New Order weakened the latter after the fall of Suharto, due to the absence of 
common ground and the contradictions arising of their different priorities. This 
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problem was not only observed within the PPP, but also within different other parties 
like the Nahdatul Ulama organization.  
Moreover, on a social and religious level, many Islamists lost the confidence of the 
Indonesian electors. After being seen as “clean and uncorrupt”, following the fall of 
Suharto, Islamist of Indonesia won the sympathy and trust of the electors in 1999. 
Their fall into scandals and corruption allegations strongly impacted the choice of the 
Indonesian people which was translated in the elections of 2004 and 2009 registering 
a decrease in the representation of Islamic parties. Jeff Lee, in the Southeast Asia 
journal published his article “Failure of Political Islam in Indonesia: A Historical 
Narrative”, explained that the Islamists in Indonesia do not have the green card to rally 
for election. He wrote that despite the support of the population to Islam, economic 
concerns, poverty and unemployment reign on the Indonesians and which would affect 
their choice for their Representatives and President. Therefore, if the Islamic groups 
in Indonesia were not able to define a clear agenda and a promising future to the 
Indonesian, their chances for success would remain low.  
The said above does not deny the fact that the Islamists in Indonesia are considered 
potential political actors, and their low profile does not mean that their existence would 
not influence, to a great extent, the political equation. Islamists in Indonesia have 
become major societal actors and their influence on the people has been increasing 
after the fall of Suharto. They were able to realize that their pure religious language 
would not serve their existence in Indonesia, and they were smart enough to carry 
corrective measures on an early stage in order maintain their presence, even if it were 
more on a society level rather than political. Due to the election system in Indonesia, 
coalition among parties is highly important in order to secure survival of any candidate 
in the second rounds and compete for presidency. SBY’s recent government included 
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four Islamic parties out of the six-party coalition, and the recent presidential 
competition between Joko Widodo and Parabowo highlighted the strong role of 
Islamic parties. Widodo, after being officially the runner for Indonesia presidency paid 
visit to the two biggest Muslim organizations, the Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul 
Ulama. With a popular base of 30 million for Muhammadiyah and 40 million for NU, 
Islam could strongly affect the outcome of the elections. Prabowo and Hatta Rajasa, 
Coordinating Economic Minister, have proceeded with their competition in a six-party 
coalition of which four Islamic parties are represented, PAN, PKS, PPP and PBB, 
although it shows that there is no common ideological ground.  
4.3.3 Difference with the Egyptian and Tunisian Experience 
If one observes the big picture and make a comparison between the three 
experiences towards the emergence into democracy, it could be realized that there are 
major factors that contributed in diverting the process from one to another. Some of 
the reasons are of historical nature, others are social, domestic and regional factors that 
implied certain circumstances on each of Egypt and Tunisia.  
Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda under authoritarian regimes were strongly 
oppressed. For political reasons, and in order to ensure protection and undermine 
potential Islamist threat, Mubarak gave the Muslim Brotherhood particularly a 
political role over which he kept a firm grip. This action, although carried out by the 
Indonesian regime during Suharto, had different impact on both, the Islamists and the 
Muslims. It weakened the potential coalition of Muslims against his rule but fostered 
their social and humanitarian role, an outcome that was not observed in each of Tunis 
and Egypt. This role was described by Jan Woischnik and Philipp Müller as 
Islamization of the society and not the politics. Consequently, this process contributed 
in reducing the marginalization of the society and its rigid division between Islamists’ 
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supporters and Secular supporters, due to which Islamists had to increase their 
tolerance and national identity over their religious’. In a poll conducted on March 2013 
and written by John Riady, less than one percent of the interviewed Indonesian favored 
a party or a political faction based on their religious affiliation (Riady; 2013). On the 
same account, Hefner, reported by Malik Miah, argued that civil Islam is dependent 
on the existence of “civil state with transparent laws, including the place of religion, 
which are accepted by its citizens” (Miah, 2001). Malik Miah adds that the colonialism 
led by the Dutch has also contributed in the rise of secular Islam through the 
suppression of political Islam.  
In addition, the political system in Indonesia requires coalition among parties in order 
to ensure competitiveness during the elections. The contradictions arising among the 
different Islamic parties became an obstacle against their coalition and urged the latter 
to build other coalitions with secular parties, shifting by which their religious language. 
The coalition among the political actors in Egypt was not clear and did not, in anyway, 
soften the language of the MB, unlike Ennahda in Tunis, who despite the absence of a 
clear coalition before the election, the latter was urged, due to political circumstances 
and outraged opposition, to call for dialogue and start negotiations with other Tunisian 
politicians. Michael Buehler in his article Islam and Democracy in Indonesia added 
that the institutional modification carried by the state and the set election regulations 
influenced the relationship between democracy and Islam; i.e. “a party could only 
become a legal entity if it registered with the justice ministry, included woman in at 
least 30% of central leadership posts and others, making difficult on the Islamist the 
task to establish and organize a structure that would allow them to participate in 
politics.  
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 An additional reason differing the Indonesian experience from the Egyptian and 
Tunisian has been explained by a published article on Fukrwa Fann web based page. 
In this article, the adds to the previously stated factors that the reason behind the 
success of Indonesia Islamists to become democratic is accomplished by the role of 
Muslim intellectuals changing the mindset of Muslims. Of those passionate 
intellectuals, as described, Abdurrahman Wahid, Indonesia’s ex-President and NU 
Chairman, Ahmad Syafii Maarif and Nurcholis Majid who also headed organization 
and acted more on a social level before political, collecting respectively forty, thirty 
and ten millions followers; the difference with Egypt is that the contribution for 
changing Islamists’ mindset was done on an individual level, also described as solitary, 
like Jamaluddin al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, etc.  
Table 4: Indonesia Islamists’ compliance with Democratic indexes, Comparison 
with Ennahda and FJP 
Democratic Index  Ennahda FJP Indonesia Islamist 
Free Fair and 
Regular Elections 
Relative 
Compliance 
Non Compliance  Compliance: Since the fall of 
Soeharto, elections in 
Indonesia are done with 
participation of Islamists and 
compliance to its rules 
Constitutional 
Limits on 
Government and 
Rule of Law  
 
Relative 
Compliance 
Non Compliance   Relative compliance of 
Islamists to rule of law in 
Indonesia, noting the 
exception of hardliners 
mentioned in Harsono article 
(Harsono, 2012) 
Minority Rights 
 
Unclear Position  Unclear Position Relative compliance. 
(Harsono, 2012)  
Accountability 
and transparency 
Unclear Position  Relative compliance  Relative Compliance; 
Islamists practices, when 
criticized and highlighted, 
were reflected in the people’s 
choice.  
Multiparty System  
 
Relative 
Compliance  
Unclear Position  Full compliance with 
integration of various factions 
in the country and obvious 
coalitions.  
Freedom of 
Expression  
 
Non compliance  Non Compliance  Relative Compliance  
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Economic 
Freedom  
 
Relative 
Compliance  
Non Compliance  Indonesia economic freedom 
ranking 58.8 (Index of 
economic freedom, 2014) ; 
steady economic growth  
Freedom of 
Association  
 
Unclear position  Non Compliance Relative non-compliance; 
Ormas law considered as a 
setback on freedom of 
association (CIVICUS, 2014) 
although not promulgated by 
Islamists 
Women rights 
 
Relative 
Compliance  
Non Compliance Unclear; no law has been 
promulgated by Islamists 
against women. Women are 
active in social related 
activities of Islamist Parties.  
4.4 Conclusion 
A country that counts more than 250 million people with an average of 80 
percent Muslims, known with its emblem Unity in Diversity, Indonesia has posed itself 
as one of the most controversial countries in applying democracy and presenting a 
prominent aspiration for newly emerging countries into democracy. The democracy of 
this country has been subject of analysis to many scholars, writers, receiving the praise 
of Nations advocating liberty and free will and defining a new equation linking Islam 
to democracy.  
Despite the fact that many saw the application of democracy possible with the 
Islamists, others still refused it and wrote, on several occasions, about the failure of 
some post New Order governments to protect Indonesia’s minorities, like Aymen 
Jawad al-Tamimi in his article “The Limits of Islamic Democracy” citing in which the 
violations against liberty and civil rights, Siyafi Anwar in his article “The Paradox of 
Indonesia’s Democracy and Religious Freedom”  regarding the increase influence of 
militant Islamists and anti-pluralist ideology, as well as the famous article criticizing 
Indonesia’s Reform era (Reformasi) written by Andreas Harsono in which he 
highlighted the inability of the Indonesian Government headed by SBY to control the 
extremists and protect the minorities. Other writers, though agreeing on the current 
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democratic status of Indonesia and although seeing that some violations are natural 
and might be applicable in any old democracy, analyzed the status of Islamists and 
believe that the latter are not completely democratic, yet waiting for the right moment 
to have a firmer grip over the politics in Indonesia and act towards the establishment 
of Islamic State. These expectations remain inadequate to the study since it foresees a 
future that is currently unable to be based on an established base supporting it. Despite 
the coalition with PAN and other large based Islamic parties that was formed by 
Prabowo during the Presidential elections 2014, and regardless the controversy that is 
currently arising of the poll’s calculation, Joko Widodo, was declared winner on 22 
July 2014. New York Times through Cochrane described the win of Mr. Joko Widodo 
best known as Jokowi as striking. He wrote that the man raised in a riverside slum will 
be Indonesia’s seventh President, being the first “not to have emerged from the 
country’s political elite. This result shows clearly that the population in Indonesia is 
not widely mobilized by the religion to choose their ruler, they rather are more inclined 
to choose based on social base which would make it harder on the Islamists to divert 
their path from social concerns and focus more on religious agendas. 
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5 Chapter Five 
 
Conclusion: Islamization of Democracy or 
Democratization of Islam 
 This thesis was set to answer the question about the Post-Arab Spring Islamists 
who ruled Egypt and Tunis. It aimed at identifying whether these ruling Islamists were 
influenced by democracy and capable to cope with it, or had influenced the democratic 
process in the Arab countries and created a democracy based on Islamic values. Three 
major Republics with politically active Islamists were studied, through which their 
attempts to rule also varied from a complete failure in Egypt, a partial success and 
struggle for survival in Tunisia, to a potential success in existence and influence in 
Indonesia. Throughout the comparison based on the democratic index, this thesis 
highlights the nature of governance of the Islamists in Egypt and Tunis stressing out 
their ability to cope with democratic value. Whereas the comparison to the Indonesian 
experience, reflects the gaps in Ennahda and FJP’s governance and their ability to cope 
with the modern society in their countries. It should be noted, that in the three cases, 
the approach for the implementation of Sharia was a threatening factor for popularity, 
not because of its religious representation, but due to its interpretation that might be 
used by the rulers to establish another autocracy under religion, but was not exclusively 
the only factor for the failure of Islamists to rule. 
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5.1 Failure of Islamists (FJP) 
 As discussed in the previous chapters, many factors have contributed in the fall 
of Morsi or what some writers call the military coup d’état against the MB governance 
in Egypt. It is also certain that what triggered the sentiments of the Egyptians was not 
based on the person of President Morsi, despite the many sarcastic critics that attacked 
the latter, but rather based on the whole process of governance with all its components, 
the Muslim Brotherhood principals and organization, its members and representatives 
in addition to social factors that affected FJP’s governance and contributed to its fall.  
5.1.1 FJP Performance 
After the end of Morsi’s rule, many articles discussed the reasons behind this 
short lived presidency with a majority stressing on the inability of FJP to realize the 
size of accomplishment and the challenges that should have been undertaken during 
their governance. Die Tageszeitung reported by Spiegel Online compared FJP to 
Turkish AKP explaining that both parties took the elections that brought them to rule 
for granted, believing that they could maneuver the politics their way, as long as they 
are in the rule. Always within the same reason of the party’s internal organization, FJP 
has centralized the decision-making process and made decisions of its elites binding, 
creating internal conflicts among members coming from different social backgrounds.  
Another reason that affected the FJP performance was its inability to cope with social 
change. This incapacity was not strictly due to its ideology, it rather was due to its 
hierarchy and the lack in responding entirely to the demands of the ruled society, 
creating contrast in opinion of the members and leading to loss of credibility. Ashraf 
el Sherif added in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that the ideology of 
FJP also contributed in their failure to approach Egyptian people and comply with 
democratic rule. He also agreed with Bernard Siman and Stephan Roll that FJP failed 
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to transform its victory into sustained politics adding that the latter was driven more 
by a delusion of grandeur following the striking victory through the first democratic 
election after the fall of Mubarak’s autocratic regime. El Sherif added that the attitude 
of MB was also opportunistic and not based on an invariable ground; FJP was ready 
to sacrifice elements of their ideology for short term political victory, i.e. their claim 
that democracy could comply with their Sharia and later contradicting itself by stating 
that parts of democracy could not go along with their ideology, whenever opportunity 
demanded so. In an attempt to highlight the ideological failure, Sherif added that the 
problem was not based on the Islamic nature of the ideology, but was based on the 
ambiguity of their claimed principles without an “authentic vision of their Islamic 
project”.  
Barak Barfi, in his article “Why the Brotherhood Failed” saw another reason 
contributing to the fall of FJP, that of their inherited distrust in Egypt political actors 
after being chased during Nasser until Mubarak. This built suspicion created an 
obstacle against FJP officials to make strong coalitions, whether with the secular 
factions or even the Islamists like the Salafi and Al-Nour, which was obviously shown 
during the last surviving days of Morsi; both Salafi and Al-Nour members backed the 
decision for his topple though they did not publically participate in the demonstrations.  
5.1.2 Social Factor 
FJP came to govern Egypt after a long struggle against an autocratic and 
corruptive regime. This governance came with an enormous challenge, not only to rule 
the people, but also to create solidarity among different State’s apparatus and 
institutions. The ouster of Mubarak did not result in the change of all the Army 
Officials, Security Forces Key Persons, or Society’s elites. FJP’s agreement with the 
military did not ensure their survival while it lacked control over internal security and 
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judiciary system where laws related to elections never passed the system and got 
blocked.  
Also, the economic burden that was one of the main fuels for the Arab Spring Uprising 
played against FJP. Although it is normal to have difficulties to re-establish the 
country’s economy after a long corruptive authoritarianism, yet many analysts 
considered FJP reluctant in this domain while some other blamed the economic 
process’ gains; they were uneven. Nader Habibi in a Crown Center for Middle East 
Studies publication highlighted the reasons behind the FJP’s failure for economic 
reform. Habibi stated the intensified economic crisis arising from the toppling of 
Mubarak then elaborated further on the economic plan of FJP; there was an obvious 
economic growth, though the resulting wealth was unevenly distributed. Also, 
President Morsi supported the proposal from IMF regarding a loan, but the Guidance 
Bureau of FJP refused it. This example did not only show FJP’s policy towards 
economy, but also highlighted, again, the impact of organizational problems within 
FJP leading to the loss of Morsi’s credibility and charisma. 
At the end, the situation reached its epic with Morsi’s decision to undermine the 
society through constitutional amendments that would have placed him over all laws 
and created a new autocracy and constituted the climax of FJP’s failure leading to its 
complete fall.  
5.2 Struggle and Survival of Islamists (Ennahda): 
Ennahda, founded on the Muslim Brotherhood principal, sharing with the latter 
almost the same fate, starting from the ouster of two respective authoritarian regimes 
and recording similar striking victories, did not follow the latter in its unfortunate fall 
and topple of its utmost representative, the President of the country, Morsi. Some 
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analysts believe that Ennahda was going through the same path of the former and 
rectified its mistake after the fate of FJP, while others advocate that Ennahda’s 
performance and social existence differ from Egypt which has contributed in its 
survival.  
5.2.1 Ennahda’s Performance 
First, Ennahda kept its promise to its people during the election campaign, that 
it would not rule the presidency, unlike FJP, whose credibility started to be lost since 
the beginning of its governing journey. Although Ennahda, like FJP, pledged for the 
inclusion of Sharia Law in the constitution draft, the resilience of the people to such 
decision urged the latter to modify its agenda and cope more with the governed society. 
This behavior with the resignation of Hamadi Jebali after the violent demonstration 
that erupted following the killing of Belaid proved that Ennahda was more keen and 
able to adapt itself to the Tunisian’s demands. In addition, during the draft of the 
constitution, and following massive opposition of the people in Tunis, Ennahda 
integrated itself in coalitions and participated in dialogues in order to avoid unilateral 
decisions that would contribute in its fall. Anis Mili in his published article in Al-
Monitor described the contrast between Ennahda and FJP highlighting a major 
difference between both parties, the ability to form coalitions. According to Mili, as 
many others, FJP and Ennahda think the same way, aspire the same goals, only their 
behavior differs; Ennahda was more able to absorb the growing tension that rose in the 
streets and smartly took prompt decisions to counter-attack the toppling forces. Unlike 
Egypt who ignored the people’s demand and exercised bluntly its monopoly, Ennahda 
resorted to building coalitions with other state actors and accepted technocratic 
government, though it would have reduced its power to control. Ahmed Souaiaia also 
explained Ennahda’s survival in his article “Tunisia’s Ennahda Movement maybe 
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learning from Egypt and Turkey”. He considered Ennahda smart at being inclusive and 
capable of compromising through enriching social justice norms in the new 
constitutions; some of Ennahda’s cadre, despite their claims aiming at the 
implementation of Islamic law, and despite the fact that they would have favored the 
proscription of Takfir (infidels), accepted the “codification of the civil state and 
supremacy of the rule”.  
5.2.2 Difference in the Inherited Society 
Being smaller in size and further away from the Arab-Palestinian conflict, the 
inherited society governed by Ennahda is certainly different than Egypt’s. This does 
not, in any way, deny the involvement of Tunisian’s youth and political actors in the 
Palestinian Case, nor does it claim that they are less engaged in the geopolitical 
interests in the region, but the burdens posed on the ruling party normally differ. 
Youssef Cherif in the Majalla web page explained that both populations were found 
on Islamist movement despite their contrasted interest in other political topics.  
On a different account, Ennahda did not face the problem of rapprochement to state’s 
institutions like FJP. Mili explained that unlike Egypt, Tunisia’s army has never 
intervened in politics nor has the country relied on this institution; the army “will not 
defend Ennahda and, in the best scenario, will leave it on its own to confront the people 
taking the streets”.  
5.3 Political Influence of Islamists (Indonesia): 
In the previous chapter, Indonesia’s society was explained thoroughly 
highlighting the reasons behind the ability of Islamists not only to survive in the 
emerged democracies, but also to secure influence in the political dynamics ongoing 
in the country. The study of Indonesia could also explain the differences between 
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Egypt and Tunisia’s experience with Islamist as well as to predict to a certain extent 
the fate of Ennahda and whether the applicability of Democracy could be sustained.  
5.3.1 Islamists in Indonesia 
As described previously in the chapter, Islamists in Indonesia are widespread 
all over the country and under different parties with various ideologies. This 
abundance of Islamists in the country may have contributed in their inability to reach 
the rule unilaterally. In order to ensure their existence, and since these Islamic Parties 
were not able to reach a common ideology, they sought coalition with other secular 
parties. This step should be followed by Ennahda in the upcoming elections, especially 
with the registered rise of opposition against the latter. It is also to be noted that the 
lack of FJP to form these coalitions led to its rapid fall in Egypt.   
Also, the Indonesian electoral law may have acted against the Islamists due to its 
extensive requirements, but it also served them in the sense of building trust among 
the people. The fear of radical religious approach has been reduced consequently. 
Moreover, the organization of Islamists in Indonesia and their activities performed on 
the level of society led to the Islamization of the society and also to their predominance 
in that field, which certainly urged the secular parties and the populist parties to ally 
with them in order to ensure additional competence for elections. This factor seems 
shy in Ennahda and FJP. Within the degrading state of economy in each of Egypt and 
Tunisia, Islamists could play a social role in order to build confidence with the people, 
rather than always depending on the religious factor to mobilize them. Ennahda and 
Egypt, like Islamists in Indonesia were elected based on their religious identity that 
resembled the majority of the people in the country and due to the sentiments of 
sympathy with parties who struggled the most under the authoritarian rule. It was clear 
through the Indonesian experience, that after the first winning election for the Islamist 
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that brought Wahid and after the fall of the latter, Islamist never gained the Presidency 
again; Muslim will not elect other Muslim who keeps him hungry. This scenario, if no 
corrective measures are taken by the surviving Ennahda, might also happen in Tunisia.   
5.3.2 Indonesia’s Society Vis-à-vis Islamists 
The Indonesian society contrasts to a great extent with Arab society despite the 
fact that the three people share the same religions. It is also due to the geopolitical 
situation that the concerns of the Indonesian society are different than those of Arabs’. 
Adding to this, the historical factor played a very important influence on the 
organization of Islamic parties in Indonesia reducing their strength against that of the 
seculars’. As explained in the previous chapter, the situation of Islamists after the fall 
of Suharto was not much sympathized since they were not totally alienated due to their 
ideology. Also, Seculars in Indonesia did not totally reject the idea of religion, though 
they did not include it in their political agenda. Moreover, the development of 
economy during post-Suharto era and under the rule of seculars, such as SBY, made it 
harder on the Islamists to compete; a factor that still doesn’t exist in each of Egypt and 
Tunisia. If the experience of El-Sisi was not aspiring enough, and if the economic 
situation in Tunisia did not flourish under Ennahda, the latter and FJP might still have 
chance to influence large number of supporters.  
5.4 Democratization of Islam 
People who went to the streets and shouted for democracy and freedom from 
autocracy were oppressed before being Muslims, they were hungry, unemployed, and 
demanded the departures of authoritarian regimes which undermined their rights for 
decades. These same people elected Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda; they elected 
the democrats, the reformist and the genuine nationals who would move their country 
towards liberty and development. These emerging democracies, if not up to the 
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aspirations of its people would fall, similarly to what had happened in Egypt. The fall 
of FJP was not due to the Islamic nature of the party, nor due to their willingness to 
implement Sharia in the first place. The fall came due to mistakable practices made by 
the latter who failed to respond to the people and to comply with their promise during 
the election campaign. It was not Islam that drove FJP to lose credibility, but rather 
was the unclear program and principles. It was not Islam that mobilized people against 
Morsi, but rather the amended constitution and the decree that placed him over the law 
that rules the sovereign people to express another form of Tyranny. It was not Islam 
that failed democracy, it was people who founded their parties on Islam and acted in 
line with their own interpretations of their ideologies. 
5.4.1 Sharia and Democracy 
Ennahda is an Islamist, yet its survival is linked to its continuous strive to 
comply with democracy and to become a model for democratic Islam. If people in 
Tunisia, Egypt, and Indonesia refused the inclusion of Sharia Law in their constitution, 
it is mainly because the interpretation of the latter may become a tool in the hand of 
Tyrants and used against democracy.  
In the book of John O. Voll, “Islam and Democracy: Is Modernization a Barrier?” it 
was written that many cotemporary scholars believe that the “Islamic doctrine as 
embedded in the test and traditions is conducive to democratic thoughts” (O. Voll, 
2007: 173). Voll adds that this correlation between Democracy and Islam cannot be 
done without recognizing the contested concept of Democracy, the liberal democracy, 
the semi-authoritarian democracy, the radical democracy, the consociational 
democracy and the associative democracy. What Voll was elaborating is the 
constructivist point of view in approaching democracy, which claims that democracy 
is differently perceived by societies depending on their cultural heritage and, and its 
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criteria changes with the change of societies. Indeed, this theory was not only 
discussed by him, but also by David Chandler in his article “Promoting democratic 
norms? Social constructivism and the ‘subjective’ limits to liberalism” who explained 
that democracy viewed by Arabs may not be similar to what is seen by western, and 
that what can be considered an undemocratic practice by western, may still be 
considered democratic by Arabs. This theory increases the chance of correlating Sharia 
in all its aspects to democracy and implies that social status considering the women 
complementing the man and not equal to him is still considered democratic, and that 
the practices led by FJP or Ennahda could be tolerated by Muslims, since it represents 
their religion. This theory, although might be tolerable by some factions of the society, 
strongly contradicts with the rights for minorities and which was obvious in different 
referencing articles that the Sharia Law, it would create imbalance in the accountability 
of citizens before the laws, and would contribute in the inability of the country to 
comply with International Declarations for Human Rights. Moreover, despite the 
predominance of Muslims in Egypt and Tunisia, their people’s practice and perception 
of Islam may also differ.  
5.4.2 Democratization of Ennahda 
 The lesson was learned; Islam, even in the countries of Muslims cannot rule 
alone. The fall of Morsi was an elaborative example of how unilateral governance 
could back fire on the governor. Also in Indonesia, and despite the Muslim’s 
predominance over the society, Islamists had to play the political game carefully. 
People wanted to practice their Islam in a stable and developed county, and being ruled 
by Muslim may not always provide this equality. This is why Tunisia compromised 
and secured for itself, until now, a certain place to compete in the future elections.  
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Although it was able to remain in power, Ennahda had struggled for its 
survival. The ruling attitude of Ennahda passed from strong aspiration for the inclusion 
of Islamic practices in the country, to a more tolerant attitude towards implementing a 
secular governance and pass a constitution that would answer the demands of the 
street. These corrective measures were able to calm down the tension that arose among 
the Tunisian, but wasn’t able to completely assert them; on different occasions, 
Tunisian protestors marched the streets holding slogans attacking Ennahda and its rule 
and demanding the resignation of its top officials from the country’s government. The 
protests that grew massively in the country during August 2013 were a live example 
of the growing opposition which outgrew the popularity of Ennahda. In an article 
published by Al Monitor, it became very clear how much of a social loss Ennahda was 
suffering. While the opposition was able to mobilize 12,000 to 15,000 people during a 
sit-in on the second of August accusing Ennahda of violence and discrimination, 
especially while dealing with issues related to women’s rights, Ennahda was only able 
to organize a counter-protest that gathered no more than 2,000 people on 13 August.  
5.4.3 What is Ennahda Missing? 
Ennahda became aware that its popularity has been reduced and that despite its 
survival, it should act cautiously to remain politically active and represented. If 
compared to the Indonesian model, Ennahda may have a chance to become another 
model of successful democracy, though it should represent itself as a potential political 
rival able to respond to the Tunisians’ demands and apply them.  
5.4.3.1 A Social Factor 
 Michael Buehler described the social influence of Islamists in Indonesia as the 
Islamization of the population. This social engagement of Islamists increased their 
popular base and made them potential candidates for elections’ coalitions (Buehler, 
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2009). It was also described by Mada Sukmajati that despite the inability of the 
Islamists to elect an Islamist president in Indonesia, their activities on the social level 
and the decentralization of their politics built more linkages with the society 
(Sukmajati, 2010). Ennahda should maintain this population-party relation to maintain 
political influence, gain credibility among its supporters, and focus on the 
establishment of its ideology without clashing with the secular nature of the 
constitution.  
5.4.3.2 Economic Development  
 The country’s economy has naturally been affected by the uprisings that ousted 
Ben Ali and later flared against Ennahda. This grown instability registered a decline 
in the country’s tourism, investment sector that affected all other economic sectors. 
The government policy, as explained by Nader Habibi, was not up to the Tunisian 
expectations; it increased government spending and domestic borrowing leading to an 
increase in government deficit. Moreover, based on Ennahda published agenda during 
the preparation of the post-uprising elections, the party was leaning to establish equity 
in distributing economic benefits. Habibi described it as “Inclusive Capitalism”, an 
economic system that allows free competition, and which benefits is distributed among 
all citizens. Ennahda should remain loyal to its promise before the Tunisian’s watch 
who would assess the outcomes at the end of their tenures and elect accordingly. If 
Ennahda wasn’t able to compete on this level, its struggle to compete would be even 
harder.  
In order to highlight its tolerance, Ennahda was urged at a very critical stage to form 
coalitions. Ennahda does not only suffer from its relation with the society, but also 
suffers from a vertical division among its members, the pragmatic and the hardliners. 
Ennahda, in order to prove its credible intentions ruling Tunisia, has accepted the 
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exclusion of Sharia from the Tunisian constitution and accepted to let go key 
ministries, i.e. Interior and Justice, to independent candidates, when the situation in 
the streets worsened. In addition, the biggest challenge for Ennahda went beyond its 
internal rift to its competition with the Islamic base. Ennahda had to show tolerance, 
ally itself with seculars, show openness towards democracy, while maintaining its 
ideology, an Islamic identity that resembles to the Tunisian people’s majority. 
Therefore, Ennahda must gain the trust of the Tunisians, keep its Islamic identity, 
respect the democratic norms, and choose the most adequate ally to reach its place in 
Tunisia, like Indonesia’s Islamists, who despite their inability to name a president their 
existence is secured, to a great extent, through their coalitions.  
5.4.4 Future of Muslim Brotherhood 
 Besides the analysis related to the reasons behind the failure of Muslim 
Brotherhood and whether the coup in July 2013 would lead corrective measures or 
create another autocracy, many speculations related to the future of Muslim 
Brotherhood are being posed trying to predict the fate of an influential Islamist party 
after its topple. Khalil al-Anani, wrote in Al Monitor that this is the toughest crisis MB 
has ever experienced since its establishment. He also described the acts led by the 
current government in Egypt as the most violent, trying, for the first time, to attack not 
only the leadership in FJP, but also reaching to the “lower rungs” of the organization 
(Al Monitor, 2014). Since it lost its power, the FJP’s proclaimed goal was to work to 
overthrow the regime who took over the rule in Egypt. Although the invested power 
is aimed at one goal, the organization seemed to suffer a gap between the leadership 
and the base; a problem that had also contributed in its fall.  
Caitlin McFall wrote that FJP remained denouncing violence, though its members have 
been forced by the government on different attempts to act against this pledge, and 
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despite the fact that its supporters believed to lead a religious task. This religious 
commitment and within this growing tension may break into an escalated violence. 
People in Egypt have to be careful reacting to the pressure exercised by the government 
and watch the performance of latter facing the challenges previously encountered by 
the FJP. If the government presented itself as a more moderate ruler and contributed 
in the development of the country, FJP might risk a bigger loss, otherwise, unless FJP 
played the card wisely, it might increase again its popularity, either through its 
ideology or even through the growing popular sympathy vis-à-vis the struggle of the 
party.  
5.5 Conclusion 
 It has been obvious through the different examples addressed in this thesis, that 
the Islam can embrace democracy as long as the balance was established between the 
ideology and the practice. Every attempt for the Islamization of the democracy has 
failed; Islamists lost popularities when they tried to establish a law based on Sharia, 
like in Indonesia, they were toppled when sought to undermine people under the 
supremacy of the Islamists’ leadership, like what happened to Egypt’s president, 
Morsi. The democratization process in Tunis and Egypt has just been initiated, and it 
does not only require rulers to accommodate themselves to democratic practices. 
Accountability is at the heart of the implementation of democracy and the preservation 
of its criteria requires the integration of democracy in the society of the people who 
claimed it. An interview reported by SSRC (Social Science Research Council), 
Christiane Amanpour stated that Egyptian people were not ready for democracy. On 
the same account, James Madison, trying to draw a theory stating in which that 
factionalism can be transformed into public good, he described that the phenomenon 
of emerging factions is an “inevitable consequence of freedom”, although it should be 
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supervised by the existence of robust institutions able to ensure that no faction 
dominates the other and the factions should be organized in coalitions in order to 
ensure that no faction or opinion is hindered by the other; a phenomenon that still 
maturing in Egypt.  Muslim Brotherhood did not fail to democratize its ideology, nor 
did it try to Islamize the democracy, it though tried to manipulate democracy in an 
attempt of autocracy, taking advantage of its religious affiliation. As for Ennahda, the 
democratization of its rule and practice has just begun, following its commitment to 
involve the majority of the country’s factions in the process. If Tunisia remained loyal 
to its engagement in the democracy process, the world will be able to witness a new 
example of “Democratization of Islam”.  
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